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
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THE CHINESE INVASION OF TIBET AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE



by

GYAN JUNG THAPA, MAJ, NEPAL

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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<p>This study gives a brief description of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet in the 1950's. It tries to show the Chinese actions during this period, and it highlights the reactions of the Tibetan government. World reaction to this invasion of Tibet has also been described.</p> <p>An attempt has also been made to expose the effects of the Chinese occupation of Tibet vis-a-vis Sino-Indian relations. The strategic advantage that the Chinese have acquired by occupying Tibet has also been revealed. (cath)</p>		

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ABSTRACT

The Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950 came unexpectedly, but it was neglected by the world. This invasion was pitifully ignored, and it was even shelved from being discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations because of Indian politics and British neglect.

Betrayed by friends and ignored by the world community, Tibet offered virtually no resistance to the invasion and sued for peace. They got peace through the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and even managed to retain some autonomy, but lost their independence. The rapid militarisation of Tibet was the highlight of the Chinese occupation. Construction of strategic roads and air bases within Tibet received priority.

These activities within Tibet were ignored by Indian leaders, who strived unusually hard to cultivate Chinese friendship and even forsook their treaty privileges within Tibet as a demonstration of unilateral gestures of friendship. India and China improved relations. During this time the Indian government was satisfied with ambiguous replies from the Chinese whenever they brought to the notice of the Chinese cartographical mistakes in Chinese maps. No one in India took the border issue seriously.

By 1954 China had completed a network of strategic roads into and within Tibet. China had also got official recognition of her sovereignty over Tibet by concluding a treaty with India. Then the Chinese started voicing their claim over areas along the border which India had always claimed and administered. The Indian Government only refuted these charges and stuck to its unilateral claim- once again failing to visualize the gravity of the problem.

Late in 1954 rebellion broke out in eastern Tibet. By 1956, this rebellion reached such proportions that Chinese lines of communication to Tibet from Tsinghai and Szechwan provinces were almost closed. Out of necessity the Aksai Chin Highway was constructed and the Aksai Chin plateau which was Indian territory, claimed as Chinese territory. The border dispute between India and China turned from a verbal episode into a series of military incidents, but Indian leaders still hoped for friendship.

The Tibetan uprising of 1959 and its rather brutal suppression by the Chinese army had significant repercussions. The Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans fled into exile to India where they were granted political asylum. This action was considered as hostile by the Chinese who shed any remaining links of friendship with India and became openly hostile. The border problem became the core of dispute between India and the People's Republic of China. Both countries began to militarise their side of the border and established border outposts along the border. Within three years, this led to a month-long border war between India and China.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet destabilized the region and effects many nations till today. Covert support has kept the active wing of the Tibetan resistance movement alive to this day, and they still conduct operations against the Chinese in Tibet. However, this aspect has not been discussed in this thesis because most of what is known about it is still classified. The effects of covert and overt assistance to the Tibetan cause have been felt by the nations surrounding Tibet, acutely at times.

This thesis presents objective views of many people who were either involved or witness to the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet. It also traces the growth and the decline of Sino-Indian friendship in relation to

the events in Tibet and friendship between China and India. An effort has also been made to predict the future of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and this judgement does not take into account anything beyond the normal.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my sincere gratitude to the various people, far and near, who assisted me during the difficult days of preparing this thesis. Despite their own commitments, many of these people were kind enough to give me some of their valuable time, knowledge, expertise, experience and suggestions. My heartfelt to all of you.

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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In the autumn of 1950, while world attention centered on the war in Korea, the armies of Communist China marched into Tibet. Meeting hardly any resistance from a small untrained and ill-equipped army composed of people whose belief in non-violence was the mainstay of their religion, the Communist armies were quickly victorious. In May, 1951, the victor and vanquished signed a Seventeen-Point Agreement which brought to an end¹ the independence of Tibet.

During the period from the beginning of the invasion to the signing of this Agreement, the Tibetan Government sent telegrams informing the governments of the United States, Great Britain, India and Nepal about the apparent threat to its independence and of its intention to send a delegation to each country. The United States and Great Britain offered their sympathy and regretted that they could not help due to the isolated geographical location of Tibet.² The Indian Government not only made it clear that they would give no military help, but also advised the Tibetans not to offer any armed resistance to the Chinese and to open negotiations on the basis of the Simla Agreement, an agreement not recognized by the Chinese.³ Nepal was in no position to help Tibet because of her own internal upheaval at that time.⁴ In desperation, finally on the 7th of November, the Tibetan Government put its case before the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly decided not to consider the question of Tibet, due primarily, and somewhat surprisingly to British and Indian intransigence, and yet these nations were the two nations most

truated by the Tibetans.

After total rejection from all sources, the Tibetan Government finally decided to open negotiations with the Chinese which ended with the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement on the 23rd of May, 1951. Under this agreement, the Chinese allowed the Tibetans self-rule, but the Chinese assumed control of defense and external affairs. For the next nine years, China consolidated its hold in Tibet and at the same time gained recognition of its sovereignty over Tibet. Over these nine years, the Chinese action in Tibet became an increasingly important factor in Sino-Indian diplomacy, and the Chinese fully exploited the blind faith that the Chinese would listen to logic- of the Indian Prime Minister, Mr.Nehru, while tightening their hold over Tibet.


Sino-Indian relations during these nine years reached a peak in 1954, when India and China signed a treaty on Tibet in which India by implication recognized Chinese sovereignty as distinct from suzerainty. After signing this treaty, the Chinese started to become more and more repressive in their rule over the Tibetans, and started, slowly at first, to undermine the position of the most revered man in Tibet, the Dalai Lama.

By November of 1956, the Chinese occupation had become so oppressive and brought about such hunger and poverty inside Tibet that the Dalai Lama, who was at that time visiting India, contemplated not returning to Tibet unless conditions changed. However, the Chinese premier Chou En-lai convinced the Dalai Lama that conditions would improve and then he returned to Tibet.

Finally, the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan uprising in the summer of 1959 forced the Dalai Lama to flee to India where he was gran-

Map I
Tibet and her neighbours

TIBET AND HER NEIGHBOURS



ted asylum. With him went thousands of Tibetan refugees fleeing the new repression. This action of granting asylum to the Dalai Lama started the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relationship, and the way the Chinese attitude became proportionately more aggressive towards New Delhi despite India's weak responses was obvious. The flight of the Dalai Lama ended Tibetan home-rule and started the rift in Sino-Indian relations which climaxed in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

In this paper, I will discuss the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the deterioration of the Sino-Indian friendship which ended in a month-long conflict in 1962 and its impact on the stability of that region. I shall first describe the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the world reaction to this invasion. Second, I shall explain the Chinese rationalization of the invasion and briefly narrate how Tibet remained under Chinese occupation for the next nine years. Third, I shall discuss the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan uprising in the summer of 1959 and the reaction around the world to this suppression. Fourth, I shall trace Sino-Indian relations in relation to the invasion of Tibet. Finally, I will assess the impact of this invasion of Tibet on Chinese military operations until 1962, especially its significance to the Sino-Indian war during the autumn of 1962.

The various sections of this thesis have been deliberately defined in order to keep the length reasonable. There are certain aspects which have been greatly condensed. For example, the Chinese actions during the nine years of occupation is condensed by relating only the highlights of the Chinese actions. Other factors, such as the refugee problem during the Chinese invasion and occupation have not been discussed. The isolation of Tibet at the time of the Chinese invasion and the lack of world attention towards the Tibetan question has led to a scarcity of these

statistics.

The fact that Tibet was so isolated at the time it was invaded is one of the main reasons for the lack of detailed reports about the invasion. This fact combined with the ruggedness of the country and the primitiveness of the people is another major reason why world attention was not focused on the invasion. I have used the account of His Holiness, Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, as the prime source of this research, as he was the man who made the ultimate decisions in Tibet at the time of the invasion. The lack of official documents, because they are either classified or non-existent, makes research more than difficult.

At times, I have relied on personal knowledge and books written by Nepalese authors either in English or in Nepali. Certain points which have come to my knowledge but which I could not authenticate either because the documents are classified in my country or because they have high political implications, are not referred to in this thesis. The official Chinese interpretation of the actions in Tibet will be discussed in accordance with official Chinese documents, speeches, news dispatches, editorials and commentaries published during the period between March 28⁹ and April 30, 1959. These official Chinese sources were compiled and printed as a book in Peking in 1959. Various other books, magazines, articles, and newspapers have also been examined during the research.

Chapter Two will describe the geographical and the historical background of Tibet and a brief summary of the relations between Tibet and China since early times. The next chapter will deal with the situation in Tibet on the eve of the invasion and the invasion itself. The fourth chapter will describe the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the Tibetan uprising

of the summer of 1959. The fifth chapter will deal with the relations between China and India during the invasion, occupation and the suppression of the Tibetan uprising of 1959. The final chapter shall present my subjective appraisal of the impact of this invasion on the Chinese military operations against India in 1962.

CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

To fully understand the rationale and the significance of the the Chinese invasion of Tibet, it is necessary to know the historical and the geographical background of the country. The relationship between China and Tibet is another important aspect which cannot be neglected. Without some knowledge about these things, one is frequently vexed with questions like why China invaded Tibet despite her plans to intervene in Korea or why the world reacted to the Tibetan appeal as it did. These questions will be easier to answer if the geographical and the historical background of Tibet is dealt with briefly.

It is interesting to note that the history of this nation has been greatly influenced by its geography and its location. Surrounded on all sides by massive mountain ranges, Tibet is the highest plateau in the world with an average altitude of 12,000 feet above sea level. Virtually inaccessible from the south and the west because of the Himalayas, Tibet, throughout her history, had more contacts with her neighbours in the north and the east, Mongolia and China respectively. The northern half of the country being a cold desert and lying at an average height of 15,000 feet and getting very little rainfall, is a bleak and sparsely populated region. The fertile river valleys of the south and the subtropical mountains of the east were the main centers of population and agriculture. Located deep in the Asian land mass, very few western nations had any contact with Tibet. Before 1950, few westerners had ever dared to venture into Tibet,

and fewer had been able to return to talk about their experience. Those few that reached Tibet were confronted by people who had remained isolated from the western world throughout their history.

With its recorded history dating back to the first century A.D., Tibet has an interesting history. During the 6th and the 7th century, the Tibetans dictated terms to the Chinese and ruled most of southern China. After the year 1000 A.D., numerous conquests, by the Mongols and the Chinese, reduced the nation into small kingdoms each ruled by a different ruler. This period made the Tibetans very conscious of their freedom and they withdrew into isolation to avoid and discourage further conquests. Buddhism, which had been introduced into Tibet by Indian monks fleeing the Mohammedans since the 8th century A.D., slowly gained importance and ultimately the religious leaders acquired temporal powers in the 13th century.

From the middle of the 13th century to the end of the 17th century Tibet drifted in and out of Chinese control. From the early 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century, there was a strong Chinese influence in Tibetan affairs, but whenever the opportunity arose, the Tibetans were quick to regain some of their powers. From 1911 to 1950, Tibet was governed by the Dalai Lama who held absolute religious and temporal power. The armies of Communist China invaded this remote country and turned it into an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China in 1950, but they let the Tibetans rule themselves under the Dalai Lama. However, after nine years of occupation, the Chinese learned that the Tibetans would not accept complete Chinese rule and they imposed their will with force. This ended the independence of Tibet and the self-rule by the Tibetans, and many people wonder if Tibet will ever be the same.

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

The Tibetan plateau is one of the largest plateaus in the world and covers an area of about 500,000 square miles. It is also one of the highest in the world, as the average elevation of this area is 12,000 feet above mean sea level. Lying north of the Great Himalayan Range, it was virtually inaccessible from the south, however, a fair amount of trade was carried out across a few passes in the Himalayas. It was therefore natural that Tibet had more contacts with her neighbours in the north and the east rather than those that were in the south and the west.

Bordered in the north and the east by China, in the west by India, and in the south by Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and India, Tibet is sandwiched between two huge nations. Two big mountain ranges running west to east form its northern, southern and western boundaries, and three more mountain ranges lie inside the country. The Kunlun Mountains in the north separate Tibet from China, and the Himalayas in the south and the west separate it from India, Nepal and Bhutan. The whole country has three distinct geographical regions which are separated by rugged mountain ranges.

The northern region called the Chang Thang is a huge rocky desert plain and covers almost half of the country. Lying at an average elevation of 15,000 feet and receiving less than an inch of rainfall annually and very little snow, it is a desolate area with few inhabitants. The southern part of Tibet is separated from the Chang Thang by the Kailas and the Nyen Chen Tangla mountain ranges. In contrast, the southern part of the country is a series of long narrow river valleys. Even these river valleys have an average altitude from 10,000 to 12,000 feet above sea level. The main valley is the Tsang Po river valley which is not more than 20 Kilometers wide at its widest. Other smaller river valleys are the Yarlung and the

Kyichu valleys. Within this region lies almost all of the fertile agricultural land that exists in Tibet. So it became the main center of population with the major cities of the country located here.


Besides the Chang Thang region and the Tsang Po river valley, another sizable and distinct region was the eastern province of Kham. This region is a honeycomb of mountains formed by the outcrops of the Kunlun and the Nyen Chen Tangla mountain ranges. This subtropical mountainous region separates Tibet from the Szechwan Province of China. The capital of this province was Chamdo, and it was also the most significant city in the region. Inhabitants of this region are called the Khampas. A friendly independent people who value the possession of firearms more¹ jealously than most others, these people had a long history of anti-Chinese sentiments.² Through this region three of the largest rivers of Asia, the Yangtze, the Mekong and the Salween, run parallel for almost 170 miles in a narrow zone 50 miles wide.

Although Tibet is located between 28 to 38 degrees north of the equator, the elevation of the country, the numerous mountain ranges within and bordering the country, and its location in the heartland of Asia have greatly influenced its climate and vegetation. The country as a whole is divided into three distinct climatic regions according to its geography. (See Map II)

The northern Chang Thang has a cold and dry temperate climate. Lying deep in the heartland of Asia and literally boxed in by high mountain ranges, rain-bearing winds rarely reach this region. This area receives less than an inch of rain annually, and snow seldom falls. Alpine and drought-resistant plants are the only vegetation in this region.

The southern river valleys, lying between ten to twelve thousand

TIBET PRECIPITATION AND VEGETATION



Conifer (with deciduous and broadleaf evergreen at lower elevations)

Alpine grass (some conifer and shrubs in sheltered locations)

Alpine and drought-resistant plants.

--20-- Annual rainfall, in inches

MAP II

feet above sea level, have four distinct seasons in a year. There is a dry and cold winter with temperatures dropping down to 3 to 5 degrees Fahrenheit above zero at night. The early part of spring is dry and cold, but later it gets warmer and increasingly stormy. This is followed by summer which has some rain, and temperatures rarely rise above 80 degrees. The average rainfall in Lhasa is about 18 inches per annum, but the record³ high of 198 inches was recorded in 1936. The rainfall in this region varies considerably from year to year, and the temperature in the shade during the afternoon in the last week of July being about 72 degrees Fahrenheit (22 degrees Centigrade) and about 59 degrees in the early morning.⁴ There is an average of 140 frost-free days during the summer. The main vegetation in this region consists of alpine grass with conifer and shrubs in the sheltered areas.

The eastern province of Kham has a subtropical climate. Here the honeycomb of mountains run parallel to each other from north to south thus forming long narrow valleys stretching into southeast Asia. This formation of valleys allows rain-bearing winds from the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Thailand to reach this region of Tibet. This region is lower in elevation than the rest of the country and as such the temperatures are warmer. The summers are longer and warmer with 30 to 50 inches of rainfall in the south. The northern part has shorter summers as compared to the southern part, and 20 to 30 inches of rainfall per annum is average. In the southern part of this region, we find mostly conifers in the higher elevations, and deciduous and evergreens at lower elevations. In the northern part, conifers and shrubs are the main vegetation.

In summary, Tibet is a high plateau which is completely surrounded by high mountain ranges, and as such has remained very isolated from the

rest of the world. Moreover, the population of the country is concentrated in the southern and the eastern parts of the nation, whereas, the northern portion is a barren and uninhabited region. As a result of its geography, Tibet, as late as the mid-twentieth century, was a land where the people were still living in medieval times, and the desire to open relations with the outside world did not exist in the government and the people. (See Map III and Map IV).


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Very little was known about Tibet to the outside world before 1950, and most of what was known came from the reports which few travellers had brought back. After the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the flood of refugees, which also included the leader of the Tibetans, has published or helped publish many articles about this mountain nation. These are the main sources of information about Tibet to the western world, however, in places where there is a concentration of Tibetan refugees, many ancient and modern manuscript in Tibetan or the local language are available. Moreover, the neighbouring nations like India and Nepal have had contacts with Tibet since ancient times, and the histories of these nations do contain many references to the events in Tibet. However, after the Chinese invasion of 1950, Tibet has been closed to the world, even the neighbouring nations do not know what has been happening inside Tibet.

The history of this high plateau dates back over two thousand years. The religious and the secular leader of Tibet, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who is presently a refugee in India, claims the amalgamation of various small tribes as a single Tibetan nation in the year 127 B.C. After that, Tibet was ruled by a succession of kings for almost a thousand years. From 907 A.D., Tibet again disintegrated into small kingdoms, and so it remained

MAP III
Topography of Tibet

Source:- CIA Map 1979.



MAP IV
Topography of Tibet

Source:- Patterson, op. cit., page following p.293.

6

for the next 347 years.

These three and half centuries were marked by war and rivalry among the three chief monastic orders in Tibet: the Sakya, the Kragyupa and the Karmapa. During these years, the religious leaders began to be involved with the rulers of the land and a rise in the power of the monasteries became quite evident.⁷ Finally, in 1253 A.D., the head of the Sakya monastery returned from China after serving as the religious instructor to the Chinese Emperor, Sechar, and became the ruler of unified Tibet.

In 1260, Kublai Khan, the powerful Mongol Emperor of China, recognized the grand lama of the Sakya monastery as the ruler of Tibet. His rule by the Sakya lamas lasted for 96 years, after which a different group known as the Phamo Drupa took over power and ruled for another 86 years. Secular monarchy returned to Tibet after the collapse of the Phamo Drupa lamas, and four generations of kings from Rirpong ruled from 1435 to 1565 A.D.; these kings were followed by three Tsangpa kings who reigned from 1566 to 1641.⁸

Around the end of the 14th century, during the rule of the Phamo Drupa lamas, a powerful Buddhist group, the Gelugpa, popularly called the Yellow Hats, came into being. The founder of this Gelugpa group was Tsong-Khapa who lived sometime between 1357 to 1420.⁹ Tsong-Khapa had a disciple called Gaden-Truppa who took over as the leader of the group and was known as the First Dalai Lama.¹⁰ Thus the influence and the activities of the First Dalai Lama began around the middle of the 15th century. The first and the second Dalai Lama do not have much written about them, but from the Third Dalai Lama, the Gelugpa group began to have more contacts with the Mongols. The Third Dalai Lama spent the last eight years of his life in Mongolia and died there. Finally, the birth of the Fourth Dalai Lama

in a princely Mongol family cemented connections between the Gelugpas and the Mongols; and the Mongols became the defenders of the common faith.¹¹

This relationship between the Gelugpas and the Mongols later proved very valuable to the former when in 1642, the Mongol chief, Gushri Khan, helped the Fifth Dalai Lama subjugate petty rulers and established him as the undisputed ruler of Tibet.¹²

It was in 1642 that the Fifth Dalai Lama became the first Dalai Lama to receive temporal power; and the Tibetan form of government that existed at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1950, called Gaden-Phodrang, was founded.¹³ Since then, for over three centuries, ten successive Dalai Lamas have been the absolute temporal and spiritual rulers of Tibet, and during their absence or minority, lay and monk regents have carried on the government in their name.

The contributions of the Fifth Dalai Lama towards the advancement of Tibetan sovereignty were noteworthy. He was invited to China in 1652 by the first Manchu Emperor of China, Shun-Tse, and the Emperor, who regarded the Dalai Lama as his religious teacher, received the Dalai Lama as an independent sovereign. The backing that the Dalai Lama had from the Mongols was something that a new Chinese Emperor, who had not yet consolidated his power in China, did not want to question.¹⁴ The Fifth Dalai Lama firmly established the hierarchy of the Dalai Lamas. This man has been accredited with building many monasteries inside Tibet and these served as the symbols of central power. The death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1682 led to a series of events that finally led to Chinese intervention in Tibetan affairs.¹⁵

The cunning and power-hungry regent, Sang-Kai, suppressed the news of the Dalai Lama's death and kept ruling in his name. This regent started a series of intrigues which ultimately led the Chinese to invade

Tibet and to begin to intervene in Tibetan affairs. He instigated the chief of the Dzungar-Mongols to attack the Khalka-Mongols. Since the chief of the Dzungar-Mongols had gained the post of chief because the regent had made him chief by usurpation, he obeyed the regent's suggestion. He defeated the Khalka and went on to invade Inner Mongolia. This forced the Chinese Emperor to send an army against the Dzungar-Mongols, and this army severely defeated the Mongols. The Emperor, who had long suspected the death of the Dalai Lama, confirmed his suspicions from the prisoners his army took, and he learned that the Dalai Lama had been dead for fourteen years. The Emperor called on Sang-Kieh for a declaration of facts, and Sang-Kieh not only declared that the Dalai Lama had been dead for fourteen years, but also made a humble apology for his conduct and begged that this news be kept secret until a new Dalai Lama was enthroned so as to avert civil war. Although the Emperor granted the request, Sang-Kieh took advantage of the leniency and again began plotting.

On the question of the enthronement of the new Dalai Lama, the cunning regent and the commander of the Lhasa garrison, Latsang, who was also the great-grandson of Gushri Khan, the Mongol chief who helped the Fifth Dalai Lama acquire complete power of Tibet, became bitter enemies. Sang-Kieh tried to poison Latsang, but failed, and was killed in 1705 by Latsang.¹⁶ Latsang then sent an envoy to inform the Emperor and was given a title. Then in compliance with the Emperor's order, Latsang sent the disputed Dalai Lama to Peking and rejected the request of the chief of the Dzungar-Mongols who had also asked for the disputed Dalai Lama.

Latsang then collaborated with the Panchen Lama, and with the approval of the lamas in Lhasa, produced and installed a new Dalai Lama.

This election was confirmed by the Chinese Emperor, but the Mongols and the Kokonor tribes refused to recognize this Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the Mongols and the Kokonor tribes brought forward a child, who had been¹⁸ born at Li-tang, as the true incarnation of the Sixth Dalai Lama. The situation became so alarming that the Chinese Emperor sent an envoy to settle the dispute, and as the attempt by this royal envoy failed, he ordered the newly-installed Dalai Lama removed to Sinning in the heart of the Kokonor region outside Tibetan control. All this confusion and the dissension formed an ideal situation for an invasion.

The chief of the Dzungar-Mongols, Chewanlaputan, who had been humiliated by Latsang on the issue of the disputed Dalai Lama, still bore a grudge against him. He first lulled Latsang into a false sense of security by a matrimonial alliance between his daughter and Latsang's eldest son. Then two years later in 1716, Chewanlaputan sent an army of six thousand men to Lhasa under the pretext of enthroning the true Dalai Lama; his main intention, however, was to avenge his humiliation. He conquered Lhasa and pillaged it. Latsang was captured and put to death. However,¹⁹ before his capture, he appealed to the Chinese Emperor for help.

The Chinese Emperor had always been haunted by the possibility of a Mongol empire including Tibet under a common religion, the Yellow Hatted Gelugpa group, and now this was close to being a reality. He reacted quickly and sent an army of several thousand men. This army was attacked by the Dzungar-Mongols when it crossed the Kalawusu river and annihilated²⁰ after a month of fighting during the autumn of 1718. Then the Emperor sent three armies against the Dzungar-Mongol government in Lhasa.

This force entered Lhasa in 1720 and took firm control of the government, and a large inscribed stone in commemoration of the Chinese

victory was erected below the Potala castle. The opposition leaders were put to death and the Dalai Lama brought forward by the Mongols and the Kokonor tribes was installed on the throne in Lhasa. This expedition was
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the first of three major campaigns inside Tibet.

In 1728, another Chinese expeditionary force reached Lhasa. This force had been sent into Tibet to quell internal unrest. The involvement of the Dalai Lama's father in the internal unrest led to the Dalai Lama being taken away from Lhasa to Ka-ta. To fill the void, the Chinese brought the Panchen Lama to take control of the government in Lhasa. Although the Panchen Lama refused to take control of all the regions offered to him, he did agree to rule three of the provinces. This period marked the creation of the Panchen Lama's political importance as a balance against the Dalai Lama. This importance of the Panchen Lama which the Chinese had created to maintain their control over Tibet was to serve them well after 230 years. The Chinese also appointed two residents inside Tibet, each with a thousand troops to guide the administration of Tibet. After fifteen years, the Dalai Lama was permitted to return to Lhasa in 1735, and when he did return, he did not have much power because the Chinese
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residents, called Ambans, were in control.

Events in 1750 forced the Chinese Emperor to send yet another force against Tibet to reestablish his authority which had lost effect due to a minor revolt. The corruption that the Chinese residents engaged in had become so pervasive that there was an uprising. Although the revolt was defeated, the Chinese residents lost most of their power, and the Dalai Lama started to regain most of his control, especially in secular matters. This period began the decline of the authority that the residents had held.

In 1865, Nepal imposed a treaty on Tibet, securing extra territorial rights and an annual tribute of ten thousand Rupees. At this time China was unable to protect or defend Tibet. Again in 1890, after a military clash between Britain and Tibet, China confirmed Britain's protectorate over Sikkim which for centuries had been under Tibetan influence. During this period, the British Government in India was seeking a trade agreement with the Tibetan Government, but had not met with much success. Finally in 1904, a military expedition under Colonel Younghusband, which²³ successfully reached Lhasa, secured a trade treaty.

Shocked and humiliated by the success of the British expedition of 1904, the Chinese started to strengthen their power in Tibet. The Deputy Resident was instructed to slowly undermine the powers of the ruling Tibetan groups. He started his program at Batang in eastern Tibet, but his interference with the authority of the lamas and his harshness led to an open revolt in which he was killed. The Chinese then appointed Chao-Erh-feng to reestablish control in Tibet. By the summer of 1906, he had restored control in Batang and the adjoining areas, and was appointed frontier high commissioner. In this post, he started curtailing the power of the local leaders and appointing Chinese magistrates in their place.²⁴ In 1908, Chao and Lein-Yu were appointed as residents in Lhasa.

In February 1910, the Imperial Army marched from Chamdo towards Lhasa. At the same time, the Dalai Lama was not only disagreeing with Lein-Yu but also very disturbed about the reforms of Chao in eastern Tibet. These two factors compelled the Dalai Lama to flee to India, before the Imperial Army arrived in Lhasa. On the advice of Lein-Yu, the Chinese stripped the Dalai Lama of his titles, and this mistake proved to be very harmful to the Chinese. Although the Chinese Government tried desperately

for the return of the Dalai Lama, it all proved futile.²⁵

The fall of the Manchu dynasty in China in 1911 marked the collapse of Chinese power in Tibet. The garrison in Lhasa was very dissatisfied with the inflation in Lhasa, and news of the revolution in China triggered a mutiny. Mutinous Chinese soldiers on the way to Lhasa plundered the population while in action, this aroused ill-feelings. The Chinese tried to regain control in Tibet by asserting that the revolt in China was under control. Finally in desperation for funds, this puppet Chinese government attacked the Sera Monastery, one of the principal monasteries in Tibet. At this crucial time of disorder, the Dalai Lama returned from India and negotiated a settlement. On January 6, 1913, the Chinese residents and²⁶ the remaining Chinese soldiers left Lhasa.

Before the Dalai Lama left India to return, he had secured an assurance from the British for regaining the internal autonomy of Tibet. This agreement prevented an invasion by the new government in China,²⁷ which had already mobilized troops early in 1912.

A news release on January 13, 1913, revealing that Tibet had secretly concluded a treaty with Mongolia, started a new initiative by the British Government for a new agreement between China, Tibet and Great Britain. China's old nightmare about the creation of an empire with Tibet and Mongolia tied together was almost a reality now. Finally, under intense pressure from the British, the Chinese agreed to attend a conference where she had to meet the Tibetan delegation on an equal footing. Although the Chinese demanded that the venue to be in London or Peking, the British made the Chinese accept India as the meeting place. Thus,²⁸ the conference was held at Simla, a hill station in northern India.

On 13th October, 1913, the meeting opened at Simla under the

auspices of a British Chairman. The Tibetan delegate, who had been carefully tutored for three months by a British diplomat, presented a proposal with six demands. These demands not only asked for independence, but also the right to denounce three former regulations and conventions. The Tibetan delegate insisted that the Tibetan claim, as far north as Kokonor, be honored by the Chinese. The Chinese submitted their counter proposal of seven items, among which, one of the items specifically asked for a clear provision stating that Tibet should be regarded as an integral part of China. Furthermore, the Chinese proposed also that the Chinese resident in Lhasa be retained along with troops, and that Tibet should not enter into negotiations or agreements with any nation except through the Chinese Government. With such varied proposals, there was no agreement until February 17, 1914. Then the British delegate proposed that Tibet be divided into Inner and Outer Tibet, and demanded an answer from the Chinese within a week, with a clause stating that a negative answer would automatically end the Convention. The Chinese did accept this proposal, and then the argument shifted to the boundary demarkation between Inner and Outer Tibet.

The British kept pressing the Chinese to agree to their terms which meant that China secede control of many areas still under its full control. Even though the Chinese had made quite a few humiliating concessions, they refused to accept the transfer of areas which were still under its full control. The British Draft Convention had eleven exchanges of notes. This Draft Convention made it clear that China would never try either to colonize or to convert Tibet into a province, all the trouble between China and Tibet were to be referred to the British Government.

On 27 March, 1914, the British delegate declared that all general

debates be concluded, and that the results of all deliberations be considered as final agreements. He also informed the conference that since the Tibetan delegate had already initialled the Draft Convention, the Chinese delegate should do the same, and if he refused, the British and the Tibetan would delete Articles II and IV which were primarily concerned with Chinese interests, and forthwith sign it. If this were to happen, China would not be consulted on future relationships between Britain and Tibet. Under these conditions, the Chinese delegate initialled the Draft Convention.

On receiving a report from its delegate, the Chinese Government informed him not to sign the formal treaty and at the same time notified the British Minister at Peking that other articles of the Simla Draft Convention could be accepted in principle, but the boundary arrangement²⁹ could definitely not be recognized. The British Minister then put pressure on the Chinese to accept the terms, and forced two more concessions from the Chinese, but the British rejected these concessions. Then on July 3, 1914, the British and the Tibetan delegate signed the convention. The outbreak of World War I a few weeks later, forced the Tibetan question to be forgotten.

In 1915, Japan imposed her will on the Chinese government, and this compelled the Chinese to be more friendly with Britain, which was Japan's ally. The Chinese President ordered the Foreign Office to work a compromise solution. On June 28, 1915, the Chinese submitted a new proposal with more territorial concessions to Tibet on the provision that the main text of the convention stated that Tibet is a part of China. First the British showed some interest, but then refused to open negotiations. In August, China made another big territorial concession, and

again the British were not pleased. During 1916, internal disorder increased inside China, and the central government became very weak. Taking advantage of this disorder in China, the Tibetans opened hostilities in the autumn of 1917. By the middle of the summer of 1918, the Tibetans had captured large areas in the eastern and the northern region of Tibet. The British Consular Agent in eastern Tibet negotiated and brought about an end of hostilities by the end of 1918.

After World War I, the British began negotiations with the Chinese on the Tibetan question. On August 13, 1919, the British Minister in Peking, under instructions, handed another proposal to the Chinese, but popular opposition to this proposal in the Chinese parliament killed this proposal. Again in 1920 and 1921, the British Government made attempts to open new negotiations, but both failed to materialise. The Tibetan issue then remained dormant till 1928.

Two events from 1925 to 1927 played another important role in the Tibetan issue. From 1925 to 1926, the Dalai Lama's government in Tibet started to become anti-British and strongly pro-Chinese, and in 1927 the National Government was established in Nanking. The National Government took the initiative to settle the Tibetan issue. In 1929, the Chinese government dispatched an envoy to Tibet, and this envoy arrived in Lhasa on February 7, 1930. This envoy was followed by another envoy, and in his interview with both of them, the Dalai Lama clearly expressed his wish to see China define Tibet's status and demarcate the boundary. This effort for the reconciliation of relations between China and Tibet was suddenly interrupted by a minor clash near the border in eastern Tibet.

In the fall of 1930, a minor dispute in Kaze district flared up and turned into an open challenge between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen

Lama. The Lhasa government sent a force that not only subdued the conflict but also launched an offensive towards the east and northeast and drove back the Chinese troops. The Nationalist Government in China was in no position to retaliate for fear of intervention by the Japanese and Britain. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the fall of 1931 precluded any Chinese military expeditions into Tibet. In fact, news of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria made the Tibetans even more stubborn. Unable to hit back, the Chinese government agreed to Tibetan terms for fixing the boundary between the two countries and announced its decision on February 19, 1932. However, the Tibetans again raided Ch'inhai and occupied parts of Yu-Shu, and this forced the Chinese to take military action.

Starting from early May, the Chinese forces drove the Tibetans back, and by July they had regained most of the area that the Tibetans had captured during their offensive in 1930-31.³⁰ Learning that the Tibetans were enlisting more men and getting military hardware from India, the Chinese stopped their advance and expressed their willingness to sue for an agreement. On October 10, 1932, a truce was signed and this truce made the upper Yangtse river as the border. A similar truce was signed between the armed forces commanders on June 15, 1933, which provided for a demilitarised zone and the repatriation of prisoners. Immediately after signing this truce, the Tibetans discovered that the Chinese had withdrawn a large part of their force, and so planned another offensive against the Chinese. However, strong opposition by the lamas in Lhasa stopped this plan from being executed.³¹ The death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama on December 17, 1933, threw Tibet into a state of internal turmoil.

In January of 1934, Ra-dreng Hutukhtu was elected as the regent of Tibet. On February 13, 1934, a group of pro-British radicals attacked

Chinese positions in Tenko, and clashes between the Tibetans and the Chinese erupted at various places along the eastern border of Tibet. The regent ordered the commander at Chamdo to cease hostilities immediately. When things had cooled down, the regent took drastic steps against the army: he disbanded a large portion of the army, stopped the purchase of arms and ammunition from India, and changed the Commander-in-Chief of the army. This action prompted the National Government in Nanking to send a mission to Tibet.

A delegation led by General Huang Mu-Sung arrived at Lhasa on April 25, 1934, and set up a radio station for contact with Nanking.³² After a great deal of discussion with high Tibetan officials, the General left Lhasa in October, 1934, but he left behind two officers as liaison officers, and the radio service between Lhasa and Nanking was also left in operation. On his return to Nanking, General Huang pushed for the return of the Panchen Lama to Tibet and the creation of a new province called Sikang along the eastern border of Tibet. Since the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1910, the Chinese had strived to raise the status of the Panchen Lama to counter the power of the Dalai Lama. Among the two moves made by General Huang Mu-Sung, the return of the Panchen Lama, especially with a Chinese escort, began to sour relationship between Tibet and China. The Panchen Lama started towards Tibet in the spring of 1937, but suddenly Lhasa decided to block the entry of the Panchen Lama. During this stalemate, the Japanese attacked China, and the Panchen Lama's escort was withdrawn by the Chinese for national defense. The Panchen Lama withdrew to Yu-tu, where he died on the 1st of December, 1937.

The death of the Panchen Lama helped in improving relations between China and Tibet. The Tibetans gave financial help to the Chinese in

their fight against the Japanese. Now the search for the reincarnated Dalai Lama became the chief concern of the Lhasa government, and in this endeavor also the Chinese cooperated with the Tibetans. The Chinese delegate officiated on behalf of the Chinese government during the enthronement of the Dalai Lama on February 22, 1940.³³ In April 1940, the Chinese inaugurated the Office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in Lhasa, but this office was destined for a very short lifespan.

The rise of the pro-British Young Tibet Group in late 1940 and 1941 drastically altered the relationship between Tibet and China. The Regent who was predominantly pro-Chinese was forced out of office and later arrested on charges of plotting to overthrow the government. This group then attacked the Sera monastery for being anti-army. By the summer of 1943, this group had set up a Bureau of Foreign Affairs, and then asked the Chinese Commission to deal first with this Bureau rather than directly with the Kashag (the parliament). The Chinese officials in the Commission refused to do so, and as a result were subjected to a lot of harassment, which ended only when the Chinese government threatened to use force. The proposed plan to open an India-China highway to supply the armies of China during World War II was flatly turned down by Tibet. An American Mission which went to Lhasa for this purpose, although it cultivated good will,³⁴ returned without the permission to build the road. Again after the end of World War II, the Chinese tried to reestablish relations with Lhasa, and still met with less hostile, but far from any friendly reactions.

The independence of India in 1947 was another factor which increased Tibetan activity to break away from China. However, Chinese diplomats still lodged formal protests whenever Tibet was drawn outside Chi-

nese boundaries. Tibetan delegations started dealing directly with the Indian Government in New Delhi. Finally, on July 8, 1949, the Tibetan Cabinet decided to expel all Chinese persons connected with the National Government. On October 1, 1949, the Communists came to power in China, and on January 1, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse-tung announced that the liberation of Tibet was the basic task of the People's Liberation Army for the new year, 1950.

CHINESE OVERLORDSHIP IN TIBET

As we have seen, although ancient relations between China and Tibet existed, it was not always the Chinese who were on top. At different periods of history, the Tibetans were dictating terms to the Chinese. During the 7th and the 8th centuries, the Yarlung kings had a great influence on the western provinces of China. In fact, Tibet was a very powerful state during the 7th and the 8th centuries.

Chinese overlordship of the rulers of Tibet started in 1260, when Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China, recognized the Grand Lama of the Sakya monastery as the ruler of Tibet. However, this overlordship by the Chinese ended in 1368, when the Mongol rule collapsed in China. From 1368 to the beginning of the 17th century, Tibet was relatively free of any form of Chinese overlordship.

The death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1682, led to the start of the Manchu overlordship in Tibet. After the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama, a series of events forced the Chinese Emperor to send a military force against the Tibetans. This force entered Lhasa in 1720 and established order in the Tibetan government. This victory insured Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet including Bhutan. Two more military forces were sent into Tibet in 1728 and 1750 to establish Chinese control over events

in Tibet. Finally, in 1791, the Chinese army came to the rescue of Tibet which had been invaded by the Gurkhas. After this date, the Chinese Emperor took firm control and oversaw Tibet as a part of the Chinese Empire.

During the 19th century, Chinese power in Tibet declined proportionately with the decline of the Manchu dynasty. Internal calamities and external invasions weakened the Chinese Empire, and these events reflected directly on the standard of the Chinese residents in Lhasa. By 1880, the Chinese residents had become so corrupt that they held little power and received no respect. The Dalai Lama slowly gained more and more authority. Finally, when the Manchu Empire was overthrown and China became a republic in 1911, the Chinese power in Tibet ended. On January 6, 1913, the last remnants of Chinese troops marched out of Lhasa.

From 1911 to 1950, Tibet remained as an independent sovereign nation. The Dalai Lama was the secular and the religious head of state. During this period, a great deal of effort was exerted by the British to get China to recognize Tibet as an independent nation. The Tibetans themselves took some initiative, such as signing a treaty with Mongolia in 1913, in which both nations declared independence. The British sponsored the Simla Conference in 1913 and aimed at having a written document signed by Great Britain, China and Tibet, and even though the Chinese delegate 37 initialled the Draft Convention, this treaty was never ratified by China. Despite repeated pressures from the British, the Chinese never agreed to treat Tibet as a separate state. From 1911 to 1930, these efforts continued relentlessly but no progress was ever made.

In 1930, the Tibetans used force and took back some of the provinces which initially belonged to Tibet. Surprisingly, the Nationalist Government in China was in no position to react with force because of various


reasons, such as internal disorder and the pressures from foreign troops in China. However, continuous aggression by the Tibetans forced the Chinese government to send forces against the Tibetans. The Chinese forces took back all that had been lost and by October 1932, a treaty stopping all fighting was signed. The death of the Dalai Lama in 1933 brought the Tibetan move, to assert its sovereignty by force, to a grinding halt.

The new regent of Tibet disbanded the army and adopted a peaceful attitude. The Chinese government was quick to take advantage of this move by the new regent. This new attitude of the Tibetan regent helped the Chinese to strengthen their hold on Tibet. By now, the Communists were beginning to have increasing power inside China.

With the independence of India and the withdrawal of the British from this region in 1947, the Tibetans had no backing in the region to prevent their being brought into China's control. Finally, the Communist takeover of China hastened the invasion of Tibet. The British withdrawal from India combined with the Communist takeover in China, created a situation whereby there was a complete lack of any form of order in South Asia. Under such ideal conditions, Communist China made a momentous decision to "liberate" Tibet from imperialism and committed her armed forces inside Tibet even though she was determined to intervene in Korea. Her decision to liberate Tibet was given some native support by the Panchen Lama- a man who was never recognized by Lhasa as ever a legitimate candidate to become the Panchen Lama. (See Map V).

MAP V
Major Trade Routes of Tibet
in the early 20th century

Source:- Fisher, Rose and Huttenback, op. cit., pp. 70-71.



CHAPTER III

THE INVASION AND WORLD REACTION

THE SITUATION BEFORE THE INVASION

On the eve of the Chinese invasion in the fall of 1950, Tibet was a kingdom of absolute monastic and secular feudalism. Time was still measured by the length of a day's march, and ancient customs dictated by Buddhist faith controlled their lives. The fifteen-year old Dalai Lama was still in his minority, and a regent ruled in his name. The Kashag (the Cabinet), which included senior nobles, senior lamas and the commander-in-chief of the army, took months to make administrative decisions, and the execution of orders took even longer.

Since the signing of the Simla Agreement and its rejection by the Chinese, the political status of Tibet had remained vague. The power of the British Empire had left the region three years previous, and the newly won independence of India had left a weak and disorganised nation on Tibet's southern border. Tibet had no diplomatic relations with any country in the world, and becoming a member of the United Nations had never been considered by the government. The only contacts with the outside world were carried out through the few missions and consulates that existed in Lhasa. The Indian mission in Lhasa was the main center of diplomatic activity, and through this mission the world received almost all the news about Tibet. Very few foreigners had ever been inside Tibet, and there were just half a dozen foreigners living inside Tibet.

In a land with an area twice that of Texas, there were only six radio transmitting and receiving sets, the only means of communicating

quickly within the country and with the outside world as well. Trade with India and Nepal was conducted through a few passes that existed in the Himalayas. All travel to and from Tibet to the outside world, even China, was usually conducted through India because going overland to China required months of walking over difficult and bandit-infested mountain trails.

News and rumors coming to India from Tibet normally was routed through Kalimpong, a small town in northern India. By the time it was published and disseminated it was usually several months old. Within the country, most of the news was carried by travellers and special messengers on horseback. There were only two radio sets in the eastern part of Tibet. The man responsible for operating these sets was an ex-R.A.F. pilot named Robert Ford, an official employee of the Tibetan government assigned to coordinate the radio communications in and from eastern Tibet. He manned the control station in Chamdo and his only outstation with two operators was established at Denko, a village on the western banks of the Yangtse river 120 miles northwest of Chamdo.

The Iron Tiger year, 1950, was full of strange incidents which the religious and superstitious Tibetans interpreted as evil omens. The sight of a brilliant comet the previous year had already frightened the people because elders remembered that the last comet had signalled a war with China. So when a gargoyle in Lhasa was seen to drip water from its mouth in the middle of a dry summer, the people of Lhasa were terrified. Then an ancient stone column at the foot of the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lama, had collapsed overnight. These evil omens were dispelled by appropriate religious ceremonies. Finally a disastrous earthquake which

hit most of Tibet on August 15, 1950, caused panic throughout the nation.² All these strange happenings combined with the devastating earthquake made many people recall the fearful prophecies of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama,³ in which he had prophesied that Tibet would be destroyed. It was more than coincidence that these fearful events were intricately linked with the Chinese preparations for the invasion of Tibet. Some supernatural power seemed to indicate that the rise of the Communists in China was an evil sign to the Tibetans.

THE EARLY RUMBLINGS

Historically, the Chinese have always coveted Tibet.⁴ During the final years of the Nationalist regime, Chiang Kai-shek planned to bring Tibet under Chinese control as soon as he crushed the communist uprising in China, but this dream never became a reality.⁵ When Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his followers passed through Tibet during the Long March, the Tibetans displayed their intense dislike for the Communists by terrorizing and killing many of their members.⁶ However, this display of hatred did not smother the Communists' desire to bring Tibet under Chinese rule. Long before coming to power in China, Mao had given thought to eventually seizing Tibet. As early as 1948 the Tibetan government heard reports that Chinese spies had infiltrated Tibetan territory to find out about the state of the Tibetan army, and whether Tibet was getting military aid from any foreign power.⁷

In late 1949, Mao finally began to put into motion the steps necessary to realize his earlier dream. The preparations for the invasion of Tibet began at that time with the training of Chinese troops in mountain warfare and of party commissars in the Tibetan language and customs.⁸

By the end of 1949, Communist papers in China were printing editorials stating that Tibet would soon be liberated from capitalist reactionaries and returned to the motherland of the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese plan for invading Tibet started picking up momentum early in 1950, and radio broadcasts about liberating Tibet from China increased considerably. Mao Tse-tung also apparently sought to gain some sort of backing for his invasion plans when he went to Moscow to bargain with the Soviets in December of 1949. Nine weeks of hard bargaining from December 1949 to February 1950 resulted in a thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan or any other power allied with Japan. This treaty provided the newly-formed regime in China the shield behind which to re-
 9
 assert China's control over border areas.

Early in March of 1950, reports from Hong Kong, quoting Radio Peking, stated that General Chu Teh, the leader of Communist China's Army, had called upon the Tibetan people to build roads so that Chinese Communist troops could march into Tibet. The same report also stated that a delegation of Tibetan left-wing leaders had visited General Chu Teh and handed him a letter expressing the desire of the Tibetan people for early
 11
 liberation. Radio Peking's broadcasts about liberating Tibet had begun in late 1949, and continued at a frequent pace. These broadcasts were heard in Lhasa, eastern Tibet, and overseas. As the fateful Iron Tiger Year progressed, these broadcasts became more frequent and the tone became increasingly more threatening; those who heard and understood their mean-
 12
 ing were indeed troubled.

Disturbing reports about Chinese Communist troop concentrations along Tibet's eastern and northeastern borders started coming into Lhasa early in 1950. Lhalu, the governor of eastern Tibet, reported to Lhasa

that the Chinese were moving up strong forces and massing them along Tibet's eastern border. At about the same time, reports and rumors circulating in the towns of eastern Tibet were even more disturbing to the Tibetan government. All passing travellers spoke of "new Chinese" troops that had entered eastern Kham near Kanting, and of other detachments that had been sighted in Kandze.

Whereas these reports were troubling to the government officials in Lhasa, which was 400 miles and at least three weeks away on foot, the people in Kham were not all that troubled because this was nothing new to the people of this region. Throughout history, the armies of warring Chinese warlords had often crossed over into Tibet either to avoid defeat or to gain advantage of the rough terrain of this region. As mentioned above, even the armies of Mao Tse-tung had passed through this region during their historic Long March.¹³ For this reason, few in Chamdo believed that there was any reason to worry. Moreover, the reports about the good behavior of the Communist troops amazed everybody. This good conduct was in sharp contrast to the conduct of the Nationalist troops in Kanting during the last days of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Although most people in Kham were not unduly worried about these Chinese troop concentrations, the top echelon of the Tibetan government was just beginning to realise the gravity of the situation.¹⁴ The true intention of the Communists were beginning to come into focus.

On May 10, 1950, Robert Ford, the official radio operator at Chamdo, was receiving coded signals from his outstation at the town of Denko.¹⁵ The signals were coming in loud and clear when suddenly, as Ford recalled later, the radio crackled, there was a pause and the Denko operator came on the air and haltingly said "The Chinese are here." Then the

Denko station went dead. This message confirmed that the Chinese had crossed the Yangtse into Tibetan territory; Ford immediately informed the governor and was instructed to relay the message to Lhasa.

Lhalu's messages about the events in eastern Tibet shook the bureaucracy in Lhasa, and a meeting of the Tsongdu, the National Assembly, was immediately convened. This was to be the first of many meetings of this body in the ensuing months.¹⁶ Most of the members realised that this was the most serious threat Tibet had faced from the east because the communism that had conquered China threatened the very ideals of the Tibetan state. The National Assembly agreed unanimously that since Tibet was unable to defend herself against an attack from China, delegations should be sent to Great Britain, the United States, India, and Nepal to ask for help. It was also hoped that knowledge of this action would deter China from attacking, if only temporarily.¹⁷ Before these delegations left Lhasa, telegrams were sent to the respective governments informing them about the threat to Tibet and the Tibetan government's intention to send the delegations. Simultaneously, new troops were raised and parades and military exercises were carried out, the Dalai Lama himself consecrating the army's colors.¹⁸

The replies to these telegrams were very disheartening to the Tibetan government. While the British government expressed its deepest sympathy and concern for Tibet, it declined to offer any real assistance, ostensibly due to the geographical isolation of Tibet and because Britain had already quit India. The United States refused to receive the Tibetan delegation, but also expressed its deepest sympathy for Tibet and stated that the United States was unable to help due to the geographical location of Tibet.¹⁹ The Indian government made it clear that it would give no mil-

tary aid to Tibet. It advised the Tibetans not to offer any armed resistance, but to open negotiations for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Simla Convention of 1914, a convention, which as already mentioned, China had never ratified. India also stated that Tibet could not in any case rely upon shipments of arms across Indian territory as she had done²⁰ in the past. This greatly disheartened the Tibetan government. Finally, Nepal which had a treaty of mutual security with Tibet, was unable to help Tibet in any way because of the ongoing revolution against the century-old autocracy in Nepal.²¹ While all these telegrams were flowing into Lhasa, the situation in eastern Tibet was becoming even more tense. The situation was complicated by the fact that Lhasa had only sent vague instructions to the governor there to take some steps to delay or deter the impending invasion.

Lhalu, the governor of eastern Tibet, was an able and determined man, and on receiving the disturbing news from Denko, he reacted immediately. Two scouts were dispatched to Denko to assess the intruder's strength, and a third courier was dispatched to inform Muha Dedpon, one of the best commanders in the Tibetan army, who was stationed north of Chamdo with four hundred men along the border between Kham and Tsinghai.

Four days later the scouts returned from the two hundred and forty mile roundtrip with the news that Denko was quiet, but occupied by some six hundred Chinese troops. Two days later, Muha Dedpon arrived at Chamdo with his men, and Lhalu planned to send them to recapture Denko. Within a week, Muha's force was supplemented with another two hundred men who had been hastily recruited from the local Khamas. It was a week of fear and tension in Chamdo, and all travellers coming from the north and the east

aroused interest in Chamdo, everyone cluttering around them to listen to any news they may have; and there was apprehension that the next dust cloud in the northern horizon might herald the arrival of the Chinese army. After a week of rest and preparation, Muha Dedpon started his six hundred men on a gruelling forced march to Denko, determined to push the Chinese out of Tibetan territory.²² The Chinese army was about to experience the first of the few acts of resistance they would meet in their invasion of Tibet.

In the last days of March, 1950, the battle of Denko was fought and won by Muha and his men, but very few people ever heard of it. Muha started the attack at midday and ran into a well-entrenched and superiorly armed enemy. The Chinese held off the attack for three hours and almost forced Muha to contemplate retreat. In his final attempt, Muha ordered his reserve force of newly-recruited Khampas to attack, and that turned the tide in his favor. The Khampas attacked with reckless abandon and penetrated the Chinese defenses. A furious battle raged for several hours and the fighting died down only after dark. When Muha finally was able to enter the village, the extent of the bloodshed shocked him. Ancient hatred for the Chinese was so strong that the Khampas had not taken a single prisoner. A search for a single surviving Chinese proved futile.

The victory at Denko was celebrated at Chamdo, but the fear of retaliation by the Chinese quickly dampened all joy, and anxiety took over. The travel time for news from Chamdo to reach Kalimpong was about three to four weeks, and before this news from Denko ever reached the outside world, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, and eclipsed the importance of all news coming from Tibet. Once again, events in Tibet had been forced to fade into the background.

While these events occurred in eastern Tibet, activities in Lhasa were beginning to pick up also. The Tibetan government set to work feverishly to reorganize the army under the supervision of a cabinet minister. The meadows around Lhasa were turned into training areas, and new units were raised, some of which were financed by private citizens. The army's role was transformed from an ancient ceremonial one to an active military one, but the lack of organization, weapons and ammunition was acutely felt. After these hurried preliminary preparations, some troops were sent out to strengthen the defenses in eastern Tibet and to garrison important towns along the main routes leading to Lhasa.

The government also launched a spiritual drive to invoke the religious sentiments of its people, hoping to boost morale. More people than ever streamed to the religious festivals and new prayer wheels and prayer flags were set up everywhere. The people truly believed that their rock-²³like faith in Buddhism would be enough to protect their independence. However, all this religious fervor did little to stop the threatening broadcasts of Radio Peking, nor did it slacken the build-up of communist troops along Tibet's eastern and northern borders.

Every caravan coming from the east to Chamdo brought news about the continued massing of Chinese troops along the border. Then one morning, word was received that large detachments of Chinese troops had entered Batang. All during this time, Lhasa had not issued any specific orders to its governor in Chamdo. Soon rumors about an eminent uprising against Chinese rule in the ethnically Tibetan provinces of Tsinghai and Sikang by the Khampas under the leadership of the rich Pangda Tsang brothers, filled eastern Tibet. It was rumored that the Pangda Tsang brothers were planning to attack the Tsinghai and Sikang provinces and assert Tibe-

tan control over the whole area. Their long-term plan was ultimately to create an autonomous Kham by revolting against the rule from Lhasa.

News about Chinese intentions to supply the Khampas with arms if they would wage war against the Lhasa government started circulating. It seemed that the Chinese wanted to widen the rift between the Lhasa government and the Khampas by exploiting the Khampas' desire for an independent Kham. An offer of arms to fight for this cause, even if it came from the hated Chinese, would probably have been accepted. This completely altered the plan of the Pangda Tsang brothers, and they were convinced that now was the time for unity between Lhasa, Kham and Amdo. One of the brothers, Rapgya, went to Chamdo to open negotiations with the Tibetan governor and with Lhasa via the radio. They also dispatched to India a missionary named George Patterson who had been working for them, to inform the world about the Chinese intention and to gain support for the Tibetan cause.

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During this period, Chinese activity increased considerably in Amdo. As a result, one of the main allies of the Pangda Tsang brothers defected to the communists and was made the deputy governor of the region. The Dalai Lama's brother, Thubten Norbu, who was a monk at the Kumbun monastery in Amdo, was also approached by the Chinese and promised the governor-generalship of Tibet if he could persuade the Dalai Lama to accept Chinese domination. Although Thubten had repeatedly refused the Chinese offer, he soon realised that unless he agreed, his life would be endangered. Planning to warn the central government of Chinese intentions and then flee to India, he headed for Lhasa.

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By August 1950, the situation in Tibet had become very tense, and in the eastern province of Kham, it was even worse. Chinese troop concen-

trations along the Yangtse river made their intention crystal clear. Reports about the monasteries of Amdo being sacked and defiled were brought by travellers coming to Chamdo. During this same time, a monk named Geda arrived in Chamdo from the east, seeking permission to proceed to Lhasa. It soon was suspected that he was a Chinese emissary who had come to espouse the Chinese cause of "liberating" Tibet peacefully. Within a few days, this monk died in Chamdo under mysterious conditions, and his body, contrary to tradition, was burnt immediately. There was speculation of foul play, and the true mission of this monk or the circumstances of his death were never determined. ²⁶ It was later confirmed by the Chinese that this monk was a Chinese subject, and held a high rank. If he had reached Lhasa and been given an audience with the Dalai Lama, the course of history may have been different. Being a high-ranking Chinese official, this man may have swayed the Dalai Lama's opinion by offering some sort of agreeable term to the Dalai Lama.

Meanwhile in Lhasa, the air was now charged with tension and anxiety. News from the eastern provinces came in codes and spoke of the massing of Chinese troops along the border. The evil omens that had been observed were common gossip and even the Dalai Lama, although still in ²⁷ his minority, was kept informed of these strange events. The government's diplomatic efforts of appeal having failed, the people were increasingly resigned to the prospect of defeat. Public morale, which had been raised by invoking their religious beliefs, was again declining, and those who understood the situation knew that their religious belief alone would not be sufficient to stop the Communist army.

At this crucial time, the governor of eastern Tibet had to be changed because his tenure was over. The new governor was not familiar

with events and the situation in Kham; and although his ancestors were nobles, his qualities as a governor, as compared to Lhalu, were considered to be doubtful. This man, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, subsequently was branded by many as a Chinese collaborator and a traitor, and his integrity remains a controversial topic even today.²⁹

While the events inside Tibet were taking sinister shape, conflicting reports about Chinese intentions towards Tibet started to appear in international news. Early in August of 1950, reports from Hong Kong quoted Radio Peking as saying that Communist General Liu Po-cheng, who was the chairman of the Southwest China Military Affairs Commission, had made a disclosure while opening the first plenary session of the Southwest China Military and Administrative Committee in Chungking on July 27, 1950, in which he said that his forces were about to march into Tibet.³⁰ On August 1, 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, General Chu Teh stated in his Red Army Day speech that China was determined to liberate Tibet. On August 15, the Indian High Commissioner in London, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon stated that the Indian government was using its good offices in Peking in the hope of moderating Chinese action in Tibet. On August 19, a report from Calcutta indicated that the Tibetan delegation, which was headed for Peking by way of Hong Kong to discuss the Tibetan issue, had been denied visas to Hong Kong by the British government, and were still in Kalimpong. As early as August, there were ample indications that the Chinese had serious plans about invading Tibet, and they made no secret of their intention. Even Mr. Menon, who was probably Prime Minister Nehru's closest confidant, seemed to be aware of the fact that the Chinese intended to use force in Tibet.³¹

During the last week of August, increasing political dissension

within government circles was causing concern to the Tibetan government. Government officials disagreed as to what the Tibetan response should be to meet the Chinese threat, and two factions emerged from this conflict. One faction demanded that Tibet should seek outside assistance and fight the Chinese; the other proposed that the Tibetan government seek a peaceful settlement of the impending dispute. Reports revealed that the Chinese had massed a hundred thousand troops, with several hundred thousand more available, along the Tibetan border with Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and Szechwan provinces. These reports also indicated that the government in Lhasa had done what it could to strengthen its defenses, and Nagchuka, a Tibetan outpost nine days march from Lhasa, had been strengthened and the defense minister, Ragashar, was visiting this sector.

These war jitters in Tibet were also felt in the Indian Foreign Office, and at this crucial moment, India suddenly removed her representative in Lhasa, Mr. H.E. Richardson, a British national and an expert on the situation in Tibet, and appointed an Indian doctor, Mr. S. Shina, in his place. ³² The Indian government no longer wanted to keep a British national as its representative in Tibet, probably because of the fear that a foreign national might disclose facts harmful to the interests of the Indian government. The last days of August were filled with confusing reports about the turbulence inside Tibet and it was difficult to ascertain the true situation.

Tsepon Shakabpa, the leader of the official mission to China, announced on August 21, in Kalimpong, that his delegation would now be holding talks with the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi to settle the political status of Tibet. This delegation had intended to proceed to Peking, but

were denied visas to Hong Kong by the British government. Another report from Srinagar, in northern India, on August 23, stated that tribesmen arriving there said that the Chinese had turned Sinkiang province into an armed camp in preparation for invading Tibet.³³ On August 24, a news release from New Delhi revealed a report from Radio Pakistan which quoted a broadcast from Radio Peking as saying that Chinese Communist army units had crossed the border into Tibet from Tsinghai province. This report also made reference to a dispatch from Taipei to the effect that Chinese Nationalist guerillas on mainland China had reported two communist armies marching into Tibet- one from Tsinghai province, and the other from Szechwan province. It was becoming increasingly more evident that the Chinese were massing unusually large number of troops along the eastern and western borders of Tibet. Surprisingly, at the same time,³⁴ Nehru remarked that no such invasion had occurred or was imminent. It is not known whether Nehru was telling the truth or was deliberately diverting attention from the Chinese actions in Central Asia, and this question has continued to elude all those who have studied this period. If Nehru's policies throughout the 1950's are correct indicators, his statements look like a deliberate cover up aimed to win over Chinese friendship.

On August 26, 1950, in a speech broadcast from his home at West-erham-on-Kent, Winston Churchill warned that a new communist attack against Tibet might come soon.³⁵ A good indication that the British knew well in advance that China was about to invade Tibet. Finally on August 30, a reliable source in New Delhi stated that the Chinese government had informed India that it was willing to settle the question of Tibet peacefully through negotiations in New Delhi. This report also revealed

that China had authorised its newly-appointed ambassador to India, General Yuan Chung-hsien, to carry on talks with the Tibetan delegation. General Yuan was expected to arrive in New Delhi on September 10, 1950,³⁶ and the talks were expected to begin in the third week of September.

During the first week of September, it came to light that the Tibetan delegation was to meet with Nehru before it started the talks with the Chinese Ambassador. Details of the discussions with Nehru have never come to light, but judging from India's budding friendship with China it is most likely that he advised the Tibetans to seek a peaceful agreement with the Chinese. Then suddenly on September 5, it was disclosed in Delhi that the Tibetan delegation would hold only preliminary talks in India with the Chinese Ambassador and then proceed to Peking as it was understood that on August 24 the British had withdrawn their objection to granting the Tibetans visas to Hong Kong. The British lifted their objection probably because the Chinese made it known that they would now receive the Tibetan delegation. The most likely reason for this action seems to be that at about this time even China was being forced by events to decide how to gain recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet- by peaceful negotiations or by force. Events in Korea, the defeat of the North Korean army and the rapid approach of the United Nations force towards the Chinese border, was putting pressure on the Chinese leaders to make a decision on the Tibetan issue. This report even hinted that the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Tibet was now remote and a peaceful settlement was just around the corner. It was further disclosed³⁷ Mr. Nehru had urged Peking to deal moderately with Tibet.

During the last week of September, reports and rumors reaching Kalimpong indicated that minor border clashes between the Chinese and

the Tibetans had taken place in eastern Tibet, and a Chinese attempt to infiltrate Denko had been foiled. Furthermore, another news dispatch dated October 2, 1950, from New Delhi stated that the Chinese Ambassador had refused to conclude a pact in New Delhi, and the Tibetans alleged that Peking would not give its envoy in India the power to negotiate the issue. Judging from events, it seems that China decided to invade Tibet after evaluating the arguments of the Tibetan delegation during the discussions in New Delhi. The decision was probably made when Chinese leaders perceived that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet could not be imposed through peaceful negotiations.

Meanwhile in Chamdo, the new governor, Ngabo, had arrived surrounded by all the ceremony due to his rank. He had requested permission to take over the full powers of the governor from Lhasa, and taken over from Lhalu.³⁸ The month of September was engaged in greeting and acquainting the new governor with the state of affairs. On October 6, 1950, a big prayer ceremony preceded the great market at Chamdo, and that day the word "Gya-mi", meaning Chinese was heard unusually often in the market place. The merchants who had come from the east were more loquacious than usual. After the market everyone went his way unaware that more than a hundred thousand Chinese troops stationed along the entire Sino-Tibetan border had already received orders to invade Tibet.³⁹

THE INVASION

Preparations for the invasion of Tibet formally got underway as soon as the communists came to power in China. Three significant factors give a clear picture of the detailed planning involved for this campaign. Firstly, to consolidate their power within China, the communists carried

out intensive campaigns to crush local opposition in Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and Szechwan provinces, ⁴⁰ the three provinces adjoining Tibet, as soon as they came to power. Second, the PLA stationed along the Tibetan border were given mountain warfare training since late 1949. Finally, Communist ⁴¹ cadres were trained in Tibetan language and customs. By subduing the local dissent along the provinces surrounding Tibet, the Chinese ensured that their lines of communications would not be cut off once the troops entered Tibet. The rugged terrain of Tibet would need specially trained troops. In order to avoid alienating the religious Tibetans, a polished cadre was essential to win over the people.

The Chinese had massed about 120,000 troops for the invasion. In the east, under General Chang Kuo-hua 50,000 troops were poised to move into Tibet. In the northern province of Tsinghai, another 40,000 troops were positioned north of Jeykundo. Two thousand miles away, in the province of Sinkiang, another 30,000 men were also standing by to attack, and had received their detailed instructions from Peking.

General Wang (full name unknown), commander of the PLA in Sikang whose headquarters was at Dergue, had received orders to attack on October 6, 1950. That night, under cover of darkness, the communist troops ⁴² crossed the Yangtse at several places and proceeded to their objectives. The garrison at Denko under the command of Muha Dedpon, put up a brave fight against overwhelming odds, but they knew that ultimately they would lose. Sixty miles to the south, hundreds of Chinese troops crossed the Yangtse and completely surprised the garrison guarding the ferry crossing at Markham Druga. Thousands of communist troops were quickly ferried over into the province of Kham. At the same time, a hundred and thirty miles further south, another large contingent of Chinese troops

crossed the Yangtse and split into two forces. One force headed for Chamdo, and the second group marched towards Markham Gartok, the only strong Tibetan post south of Chamdo. (See Map VI for the invasion of Kham).


In the northern province of Tsinghai, three separate Chinese forces entered Kham on the night of October 6, 1950. One crossed the Yangtse 20 miles north of Denko and headed south. The second force headed south from Jeykundo and aimed at cutting off any Tibetan forces retreating from Denko and Rangsum. The third force moved into Tibet from Nanchen and went towards Riwoche to sever the route from Chamdo to Lhasa.

Two thousand miles away, 30,000 troops in Sinkiang province started their campaign from the town of Khotan with western Tibet as their objective. They started their arduous and dangerous journey of crossing the Kunlun mountains and then crossing the Aksai Chin desert, the terrible region described as the "frozen sea" by Marco Polo. The Chinese completely surprised both the Tibetans and the world by this move because not only was the desert considered impassable for a modern army, but also because Aksai Chin was Indian territory and no one believed that the Chinese would dare offend India. India at that time was their closest ally in Asia, and such a violation of India's territory could jeopardize Sino-Indian relations. (See Map VII for the invasion of Tibet)

On October 7, heavy fighting continued at Denko where the Tibetans had prevented a crossing during the night. Rangsum had fallen, as had Markham Druga and Markham Gartok, but the garrison had withdrawn to the first pass on the way to Chamdo and there the Tibetans prepared to block the Chinese.

At Denko and the pass southwest of Rangsum, heavy fighting continued throughout the day of October 8, but two days of fighting against

THE INVASION OF KHAM




MAP VI

Source:- Karan, op. cit., p. 16.

MAP VII

Invasion of Tibet

CHINESE INVASION OF TIBET



overwhelming odds and against an army equipped with superior weapons had its effects on the men. That night the Tibetan troops at the pass were told by their commander to disband, and everybody was told to save himself.⁴³ Thus the route from Rangsum to Chamdo lay wide open to the Chinese after the night of October 8, 1950.

That same fateful day, a news dispatch from Hong Kong reported that communist troops had entered northern Tibet. This news was also heard over the Chinese Communist radio, according to a news release from London. However, that same day, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, which had been the focal point of the Tibetan issue for months, denied reports about the Chinese invasion of Tibet.⁴⁴ The Indian representative in Lhasa, who was still new at his job, actually did not know the facts until many days later and so failed to inform his government. The lack of timely and accurate reports flowing into New Delhi and the ambiguous news releases from the Indian government created a very confusing picture about the situation in Tibet.

Although the Chinese had started their invasion in eastern Tibet on the night of October 6, news about the invasion never reached Chamdo until the night of October 10, and did not reach Lhasa until ten days after the invasion began.⁴⁵ The governor of Kham continued to attend religious functions and administer the affairs of his region, ignorant of the impending disaster. On the night of October 10, a lone rider brought the news of the invasion to the governor.⁴⁶ Chamdo woke up on October 11, to the terrible news that Rangsum, Markham Druga, and Markham Gartok had fallen, and that the Chinese were converging on Chamdo. What had happened to Muha Dedpon at Denko was unknown. This caused a minor panic as well as

a demonstration by the local inhabitants to show resoluteness to resist the Chinese.

The central government in Lhasa was still in the dark as to what was happening in its eastern region. Even though the Indian government had so far denied any knowledge of the Chinese invasion, a Calcutta news release dated October 11, surprisingly reported that Chinese Communists had invaded Tibet across her eastern border and penetrated 50 miles against some opposition- this news had come to Calcutta from Kalimpong.⁴⁷ News about Tibet coming out of Calcutta was usually more recent and reliable than that coming out of New Delhi because Calcutta was closer to Kalimpong than was Delhi, and also Calcutta was the chief port of entry for people and goods destined for Tibet.

To this day, there is little known of the events that took place in Chamdo during those next few turbulent days, and the picture still remains vague. Based on what available information there is, it appears that Ngabo, although he had assured the demonstrators on October 11 that he would stand up and fight, had secretly dispatched a message to Lhasa asking the Tibetan government for permission to capitulate. The National Assembly refused his request and ordered him to resist the Chinese. Many sources have however reported that Ngabo, from his position of authority as the governor, did little to organise any significant opposition to the Chinese, and that he began to prepare for withdrawing to Lhasa.⁴⁸ This is borne out by the fact that on October 15, he suddenly abandoned Chamdo and started to flee towards Lhasa, followed by a stream of officials and soldiers. The Khampas wanted to fight and had begged Ngabo to be supplied with arms and ammunition from the government arsenal, but the governor had the armory blown up. This caused anger and frustration among

the Khamas. No sooner had the governor and his officials abandoned Chamdo than their houses were looted by local brigands. This continued till the next day when Muha Deqpon arrived and put a stop to the looting.

Back at Denko, Muha had prevented the Chinese from crossing the Yangtse for six days, but on the sixth day he was attacked by the force that had crossed over twenty miles upstream. Realising that he could not resist the forces that had outflanked him, on the night of October 12, without being detected he slipped out of Denko with his men and headed for Chamdo. He arrived at Chamdo on the 16th and found that Kham had been abandoned the previous day by the governor and his men. After putting a stop to the looting in the town, he left behind a few soldiers and headed out to find and persuade the governor that efficient resistance could still stop the Chinese.

Meanwhile, a day's march out of Chamdo, Ngabo was informed that a Chinese column, that had entered Tibet from Nangchen in the Tsinghai province, had attacked Riwoche (also called Leiwuchi) and cut off the route to Lhasa. Dejected and defeated, he and his entourage took refuge in a lonely monastery and awaited the arrival of Chinese troops. It was here that he was found by Muha and his followers, now reinforced with a detachment from Lhasa which Muha had encountered just outside of Chamdo. Despite Muha's repeated pleas to either return to Chamdo and resist or to break through the Chinese line blocking their withdrawal route and head for Lhasa, Ngabo declined to resist and told Muha that he tended to await the arrival of the Chinese and then he would surrender. On October 17, a Chinese patrol came upon the monastery by accident, and Ngabo surrendered along with 750 well-armed men and his British radio operator.

His surrender effectively ended Tibetan resistance to the Chinese invasion after only ten days.⁴⁹ After this, all accounts of Muha Dedpon stop, and he probably was also forced to surrender to the Chinese along with Ngabo. Ford was later charged by the Chinese with the murder of the monk Gede who had died in Chamdo.

On the night of October 19, 1950, star shells and sky rockets turned the midnight sky over Chamdo into day. The terror-stricken civilians and the few remaining military men concluded that Chamdo was surrounded and resistance was useless. Many deserted and fled out of town. Only the next morning did the Tibetans realize that they had been tricked by two small groups of Chinese armed with pyrotechnics. During the night, the Chinese had infiltrated the town, and by morning Chamdo was in Chinese hands without a single shot having been fired.⁵⁰ The provincial capital of Kham had fallen, and this also marked the end of major Chinese troop movements into Tibet till September 1951.⁵¹ The military portion of the invasion of Tibet had for all intents and purposes ended.

Lacking in organisation, outnumbered 10 to 1 and fighting with obsolete weapons, the Tibetan army was no match for the experienced and well-equipped Communist army. Taking advantage of the hostile terrain, the Tibetans could have put up a stiff resistance, and this might have delayed the invasion for months, especially with winter only weeks away.

Ngabo's surrender along with 750 of the best-armed Tibetan soldiers early in the invasion can be considered as the single most decisive factor for the collapse of Tibetan resistance. Had these men been allowed to put up a determined fight in eastern Tibet, it could have delayed the Chinese for months; and the possibility of world attention being focused

on the Tibetan cause and changing the course of events in Tibet cannot be ruled out all together.

Lhasa's lack of efforts to gain world recognition of the independent political status of Tibet provided the necessary incentive for the Communists to invade with impunity. The manner in which India declined to back the Tibetans, despite the fact that India had continued to enjoy the treaty privileges acquired by the British rule in India, illustrated that during a time of crisis Tibet was abandoned by those whom she considered to be her most ardent supporters.

WORLD REACTION

India's common 2000-mile long border with Tibet made it necessary for her to maintain a continuous interest in Tibet. However, Indian Prime Minister Nehru felt that Sino-Indian friendship was essential for peace and stability in the region, and this feeling far outweighed, in importance, traditional ties with Tibet. Indian foreign policy directly reflected India's quest for friendship with Communist China. This attitude combined with the reported advice of India's Ambassador to China, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, not to oppose Chinese annexation of Tibet, had a great deal of impact on Indian reactions to the Chinese invasion.

As already mentioned, news of events in Tibet took weeks to reach the international community, and it was usually through India. Until October 16, 1950, Tibetan officials in Kalimpong were still denying reports about the Chinese invasion. Strangely enough, although New Delhi maintained radio links with Lhasa and Peking, as late as October 16 Indian officials repeatedly stated that the invasion reports had not been confirmed by their representatives in Peking or Lhasa. Whether India

was deliberately concealing China's actions or she in fact was not aware of the truth has never been clearly established, but India has never changed this statement.

On October 21, a memorandum was delivered to the Chinese Foreign Ministry by the Indian Ambassador to Peking stating inter alia that "a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China, a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs." The Chinese ignored this memorandum as their forces had already been committed in Tibet since the 6th of October. On October 25, a Peking broadcast monitored in Tokyo, said that the communist army's "liberation" move into Tibet was disclosed in a dispatch of October 24 from Chungking, China. The dispatch said:

A political mobilization directive to the People's (Communist) Army Units, which have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free 3,000,000 Tibetans from imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defenses of the western borders of China, has been issued jointly by the Southwest China Bureau of the Communist Party of China, the southwest military area, and the headquarters of the Second Field Army.

By this dispatch, the Chinese admitted that their forces had invaded Tibet. ⁵⁴ After being assured of the collapse of the Tibetan resistance movement, the Chinese government had finally disclosed to the world that her troops had indeed advanced into Tibet.

Up to this time, the Indian Foreign Ministry was able to admit only that it had reports of certain troop movements and incursions by Chinese Communists along the Sino-Tibetan border. It seemed obvious that the Indian government was still trying to conceal Chinese activities within Tibet.

On October 26, a dispatch from Peking received by a leftist news-

paper in Hong Kong, reported that the Tibetans had decided to surrender to the Chinese and negotiate for as much autonomy as possible. This dispatch also said that the negotiations would be conducted within the framework of the proposal which China had sent to Lhasa three days earlier and before the Radio Peking announcement of October 25.

After the receipt of the Chinese proposal, the Tibetan government ordered its delegation, which had been in New Delhi for six weeks, to proceed to Peking at once to negotiate with the Chinese. Private telegrams from the Tibetan Regent in Lhasa, received in London, indicated that the Tibetan government had abandoned the hope of successful resistance and would seek only to get the best terms it could. Advice from the Foreign Ministry in London to the Indian government indicated that on October 24, Britain had promised the Tibetan delegates transit facilities through Hong Kong; the Chinese, however, had made it well known that they did not want the delegation until they went to Peking on a surrender basis.⁵⁵ That same day, the Indian government dispatched another note to Peking reiterating that the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet was most surprising and regrettable to India.

On October 30, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a sharp reply to India stating that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet was entirely a Chinese internal affair. This reply also pointed out that the Central People's Government (CPG) was exercising its sovereign rights, and that the regional autonomy granted by the Chinese government to the national minorities inside the country was an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. This of course was meant to apply to the Tibetans also.

On October 31, the Indian government sent another note to China, but this one was much less forceful than the note of October 26. This note only suggested that in view of China's use of force in Tibet, the Indian government was no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking unless the Chinese government ordered its troops to halt their advance into Tibet. This note concluded that the government of India could only express its earnest hope that the Chinese government would still prefer peaceful negotiations and settlement to a solution under duress and by force. (See Appendix B for details of the Notes exchanged between India and China on October 26, 29 and 31.) As these notes were being exchanged between India and China, two officials sent by Ngabo arrived in Lhasa to tell the Cabinet that he was a prisoner, to ask for authority to negotiate terms of peace, and also to assure the Cabinet that the Chinese would not extend their rule over more Tibetan territory. ⁵⁶ Taking into account the lack of world support and the prevailing situation, this proposal was seriously considered and finally approved by the Dalai Lama.

By October 31, 1950, the stand taken by many nations on the question of Tibet had become quite clear. On October 28, according to a report published in Pravda, the Russians hailed the return of freedom, ⁵⁷ peace and democracy to Tibet and praised the Chinese troops for liberating the oppressed masses of Tibet. Washington, London and Paris, on the other hand, were concerned about the communist aggression which they viewed as shocking and deplorable, and offered their utmost sympathy towards the Tibetans. However, at a time when the United States, Britain and France were too busy in Korea, Malaya and Indochina, respectively, these countries were not concerned enough to be willing to offer assist-

ance or intervene themselves. Tibet after all was still far removed from
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 any vital nerve center of the Western World.

The Indian External Affairs Ministry disclosed on October 31, that Tibet had asked India for diplomatic help and not military help. It also stated that India was unlikely to sponsor Tibet's case in the United Nations. Reports from the Indian representative in Lhasa, Dr. S. Shina, indicated the last reported location of Chinese troops to be Pemba (also called Pienpa) about 200 miles east of Lhasa, and lying just east of the strategic pass of Shargung La which was 16,700 feet high. The average caravan march time from Pemba to Lhasa was four weeks, but this distance
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 could be covered by forced march on horseback in two weeks. Here again, vague reports from India gave the impression that the situation in Tibet was not all that bad, and this had an adverse effect on world reaction from uniting for the Tibetan cause.

The first week of November was filled with unconfirmed rumors about events in Tibet, and even the Indian representative in Lhasa remained mysteriously quiet for a week. Reports that Chinese troops were only 50 miles away from Lhasa were printed by The Christian Science Monitor on November 4, 1950, and this report also mentioned that the Dalai Lama and fifty Tibetan officials had left Lhasa for an undisclosed destination. However, a report from Lhasa by Dr. Shina on November 5 broke the silence. Shina's report disclosed that the Dalai Lama and his regent were still in Lhasa, but the location of the Chinese invaders was not very clear from his report. His report a week earlier had mentioned that the Chinese troops were within 250 air miles of Lhasa, but the November 5 message did not mention anything about this nor did it mention a second Chinese column reported moving on Lhasa from the north. This force had

earlier been reported to have captured Nagchuka, 150 air miles due north of Lhasa. Indian officials summed up by saying that the Chinese army had captured Lho Dzong on October 22, the Tibetans had withdrawn to Pemba, and the Chinese troops had halted their forward push and were regrouping after the capture of Chamdo.⁶⁰ Even though the Indian government had radio contact with Lhasa and an Indian representative was present there, reports emanating from official sources in India were as vague as, if not more so, than the Indian news media. This definitely had a tremendous influence on world reaction to the Tibetan issue, as was later reflected during the voting in the United Nations.

While the world received conflicting reports about the events in Tibet, the Tibetan Cabinet and the National Assembly was busy deciding important issues. The Cabinet had consulted the State Oracle who had urged them to invest the Dalai Lama with the ruling powers necessary to lead a united Tibet during these difficult times, and approached the Dalai Lama with this prospect. Initially the Dalai Lama was hesitant to take such extensive ruling powers while in minority, but when the National Assembly convened and decided the same, and added its plea also, he agreed.⁶¹ Preparations for the ceremony were undertaken immediately.

The National Assembly now consulted the Oracle to make another important decision concerning the Dalai Lama- whether he should remain in Lhasa, and risk being there when the Chinese arrived, or leave. It was decided that the Dalai Lama should leave Lhasa and go to the town of Yatung. This would place the Dalai Lama near the Indian border and out of personal danger.

By November 7, more nations voiced their view about the events in Tibet. The Indian Prime Minister stated that he had no concern that

the Chinese invasion of Tibet would spread the fighting into his own country. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, for reasons unknown, declined to comment on the situation even though the massing of the Chinese troops in western Tibet and the Sinkiang province placed large number of troops very close to the border of Pakistan. Burmese information secretary, U Thant, speaking over Radio Rangoon, stated that Burma was not overjoyed with the situation and favored a non-aggression policy and that Burma⁶² would not take sides. Tibet was being disowned by all her neighbors during a time of crisis.

After the Tibetan Cabinet decided to put its case before the United Nations, the government, through its delegation which had abandoned its abortive journey to Peking and was awaiting at Kalimpong, sent an appeal to the world body.⁶³ This appeal was received by the United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie on November 13, 1950, and it requested the United Nations to intervene and help Tibet against the aggression. After dispatching this appeal to the United Nations, the Dalai Lama was⁶⁴ pressed by his advisors to leave Lhasa, and he reluctantly agreed.

On November 15, when the Tibetan issue was brought up in the United Nations, it was rather surprising that the delegate to the United Nations from El Salvador, Dr. H.D. Castro, made the request to have the⁶⁵ Tibetan appeal put on the agenda. This request by El Salvador was questioned in the United Nations and some nations alleged that El Salvador had acted under the influence of another government, but Dr. Castro strongly denied this and said that his government was performing a duty⁶⁶ under the Charter of the United Nations. This seemed to be a valid argument because El Salvador considered the Chinese invasion to be an act

of outright aggression by a bigger nation against a smaller one, and such actions could occur to any small nation unless world opinion was brought to bear against this trend. The ensuing discussion in the General Committee of the General Assembly revealed the opinion and the stand of each concerned power on the Tibetan issue. The stand taken by the British and the Indian delegate were the most crucial ones.

Mr. Young, the British delegate, proposed that since the committee did not know what exactly was happening in Tibet, and since the legal status of Tibet was not clear, the El Salvador delegate's request be deferred.

The Soviet delegate, Mr. Jacob A. Malik, seconded the British proposal, and added that Tibet was an inalienable part of China and so its affairs were China's exclusive concern. He ridiculed the El Salvador delegate for not citing any international instrument to support his argument. Stating that since the United States, Britain and Russia had recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet for a long time, the United Nations would be violating China's internal affairs by considering the Tibetan problem; and if it did so, he would vote for the outright rejection of the Tibetan problem. Malik's claim that the United States, Britain and Russia had recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet does not have any basis as can be seen from the ensuing discussions.

The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, delegate of India, expressed his desire not to give an opinion on the problem and believed that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful negotiations without endangering the autonomy of Tibet. He, therefore, proposed that the idea of including the Tibetan issue on the agenda of the General Assembly be abandoned for the time being. His referral to Tibetan autonomy is very ambi-

gious and reflects the typical attitude of the Indian government in regard to the Tibetan question.

The delegate of Nationalist China, Mr. Liu Chieh, opposed putting the Tibetan appeal on the agenda as a separate item, because he pointed out that Tibet had been a part of China for seven hundred years and was still a part of China. He thought, however, that the Tibetan appeal should be discussed, but under the heading of Chinese complaint of Soviet aggression on China. As already mentioned, the Chinese, whether Nationalist or Communist, considered Tibet as part of China, this was possibly the only issue on which both agreed.

Mr. Ernest Gross, the United States delegate, voted for adjournment in view of the fact that the interested party, India, had told the General Committee that it hoped for a peaceful and honorable settlement of the Tibetan question. He also mentioned that had it been otherwise, he would have voted for the inclusion of the item on the General Assembly agenda.⁶⁷ India's opinion seemed to have made the important change in the decision of the United States.

On November 24, the General Committee of the General Assembly postponed indefinitely the discussion on the request of the El Salvador delegate because of India's comment.⁶⁸ Hoping against hope, the Tibetan delegation again sent a cablegram to the United Nations on November 28,⁶⁹ to urge the immediate discussion of its appeal. On December 8, it sent still another cablegram to the world body voicing great surprise and regret and expressed its wish to send a delegation to Lake Success to present its case while the Chinese Communist delegate was also there in connection with the Korean issue. It also expressed its willingness to

receive any investigation party to be dispatched by the United Nations. A point of interest at this stage is that the United Nations never responded to these later appeals from the Tibetan government.

The rejection of the Tibetan appeal by the United Nations was a grievous blow to the Dalai Lama's government. The Dalai Lama felt that not only did nobody offer military help to Tibet, but also the friends of Tibet had not helped them to present their plea for justice.⁷¹

In the meantime, in Tibet, in accordance with the prophecies of the oracles, the Dalai Lama assumed full ruling powers on November 17, one and one half year ahead of schedule, in order to guide his imperial realm in a time of grave crisis. Traditionally, the Dalai Lama assumed full powers at the age of eighteen, but the present Dalai Lama had just turned sixteen on June 6, 1950, according to the Chinese method of reckoning, which counted birthdays from the day of birth instead of from the first anniversary as the westerners do. This action in Lhasa was expected to bring about unity inside Tibet and at the same time would be a set-back to the Chinese-sponsored Panchen Lama, who had been the historical rival of the Dalai Lama.⁷² The guarded optimism generated by the Dalai Lama's assumption of full power was countered by the arrival of more bad news.

About this time, Thubten, who had left Kumbun in August, arrived in Lhasa and informed the Dalai Lama about Chinese activities and atrocities in his region.⁷³ His reports clearly indicated that the Chinese were making a point of destroying the monasteries as soon as they moved into an area.

The last week of November was full of activities to prepare for the move of the Dalai Lama to Yatung. In Lhasa, daily caravans of heavily

laden mules were seen leaving the town in the charge of members of the Dalai Lama's bodyguard, apparently transferring his treasures to safety across the border into Sikkim. During this same time, this event made news in New York and London, and some reports indicated that as much as 5000 pounds of gold crossed into Sikkim.

By this time, the Chinese had also started their judisdriction in eastern Tibet, and they pressed their first murder charge against a captured employee of the Tibetan government. On December 4, 1950, Robert Ford, the British radio operator who had been captured at Chamdo, was accused of poisoning Geda, the deputy Chairman of Sikang provincial government council, according to the New China News Agency.⁷⁴ Whether Ford had actually poisoned Geda or the Chinese were making a scapegoat of him is not known.

Despite many rumors spread from Kalimpong about the progress of the Chinese army, no further advance was undertaken during the winter after Shargung La pass in eastern Tibet was seized. However, the Chinese had made their deepest penetration in western Tibet and captured Rudok and Gartok. From these vantage points, they were able to control the western passes to India and make a quick drive to Shigatse from the west. Now the prospect of the Dalai Lama's escape route to India being cut off by the Chinese looked ominous. Depressed and dejected, the Dalai Lama⁷⁵ prepared to leave Lhasa.

Before he left Lhasa, the Dalai Lama appointed two Prime Ministers, Losang Tashi, a high ranking monk official, and Lukhangwa, a veteran and experinced lay administrator. He gave them full authority and made them jointly responsible for running the country in his absence. He told them

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to refer to him only matters of the highest importance. On December 19, the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and headed for Yatung near the Indian border. He had an escort of forty nobles and a guard of some two hundred hand-picked and well-armed soldiers. His belongings were carried by 1500 pack animals. He passed through Gyantse, and sixteen days after leaving Lhasa⁷⁷ reached Yatung where he set up a provisional government. A service of couriers was established between Lhasa and the provisional government.

The next major development in the invasion of Tibet was the appointment of a delegation by the Dalai Lama to negotiate with the Chinese. Although it had been rumored as early as November 28 that Lhasa had appointed a delegation to negotiate peace with the invading communists, the Dalai Lama had only given Ngabo the authority he requested by sending back to Chamdo one of the officials that had brought the request with the decision that Ngabo was to open negotiations on the firm condition that the Chinese armies would not advance any further into Tibet. Then early in 1951, the Chinese Ambassador to India conveyed to the Tibetan government that they should send their delegation to Peking. The Dalai Lama then appointed four more officials to assist Ngabo in the negotiations⁷⁸ to be held in Peking.

Ngabo Ngawang Jigme and his party of Khenching Thubten Lekmon and Rimshi Sampho proceeded from Chamdo via Chengtu to Peking. From Yatung, assistant representative Dzasa Khemey and Khenchung Thupten Tendar with interpreters Taklha Sey and Sadu Rinchen left for Peking via Calcutta and Hong Kong, furnished with the necessary credentials as representatives of the Tibetan government. Ngabo and his party reached Peking on April 22, 1951, and Khemey and his group arrived on the 26th. On April 29, 1951, the negotiations started with Li Wei-han as the chief

delegate for the Chinese government and Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua,
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 and Sun Chin-yuan as his assistants.

Upon the conclusion of negotiations on May 23, 1951, an agreement was signed and it contained seventeen articles. This agreement, called the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, is popularly called the Seventeen-Point Agreement.

The Seventeen-Point Agreement contained six major provisions, and they were:

- (1) It called for Tibet to return to the big family of the Motherland-- the People's Republic of China.
- (2) It stated that the Tibetan people had the right to exercise regional autonomy under the leadership of the central government.
- (3) It guaranteed that the central government would not alter the existing political system in Tibet.
- (4) It assured the Tibetans freedom of religion.
- (5) It called for the Tibetan troops to be gradually integrated into the PLA, and become a part of the national defense forces of the People's Republic of China.
- (6) The central government in Peking would assume control of all external affairs involving or relating to the area of Tibet. This agreement let the Tibetans rule themselves, but the Chinese would run the external affairs and the defense of Tibet.

This agreement was signed by the Tibetan delegation under duress, as was later revealed. They were not allowed to change the draft of the agreement which had already been prepared by the Chinese when the meeting started. The Tibetan delegation had been insulted, abused and threatened with personal violence, and with further military action against the Tibetan people. After the agreement was signed, neither the Dalai Lama nor the Tibetan government was informed, and Chinese intentions for this action remains controversial. It seems that the Chinese wanted to soften the blow that this agreement would have on the Tibetans by first announcing it over the radio. The Dalai Lama was shocked when he heard the terms of the agreement in broadcast over Radio Peking. He felt that the terms

of the agreement were far worse and more oppressive than anything he had
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imagined. The Tibetan delegation refused to affix the seals which were
needed to validate the agreement, but the Chinese forged duplicate Tibe-
tan seals in Peking, and then forced them to seal the document with the
forged seals.

CHAPTER IV

CHINESE OCCUPATION AND THE UPRISING

INTRODUCTION

Communist China began consolidating its occupation of Tibet immediately after the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Although the Chinese used caution in the beginning, they were intent on getting world recognition of their sovereignty over Tibet and then turning the Tibetans towards the goals of communism. To achieve this aim in Tibet, the Chinese had to maintain a large occupation army, and the construction of roads for military purposes was immediately undertaken in support of such a force. However, when this huge force was maintained by consuming the local food supply, the situation turned for the worse. In the mean time, communist reforms were so unpopular that they had to be postponed. For nine years, the situation all over Tibet never really stabilised.

Repression of all popular uprising in Tibet led to direct communist interference with Tibetan religion and customs, and local resentment against the Chinese mounted steadily. All this erupted in a mass uprising against the Chinese in 1959, to which the Chinese reacted with brutal force. As a result, the Dalai Lama fled to India where he was granted political asylum. The autonomous homerule that the Tibetans had been guaranteed under the Seventeen-Point Agreement quickly came to an end, if it in fact had ever existed.

In the international arena, the Chinese were never really challenged by anybody on their actions in Tibet. Although the Indian govern-

ment's notes and protests were ignored by the Chinese, the Indian government never objected or stood up against the Chinese indifference. The Chinese correctly calculated that because of the attitude of Prime Minister Nehru, the Indian government could be temporarily ignored without it affecting their relations. At the same time, the Chinese did not want to sever relations with India because they had many more aims to achieve in Tibet for which good relations with India were crucial. Adopting a shrewd policy, the Chinese were able to get official Indian recognition of their sovereignty over Tibet by signing an agreement on Tibet with India in 1954. Sino-Indian relations were further strengthened by India's voluntary withdrawal of her troops from Tibetan territory and by the renouncement of various privileges at the towns of Gyantse and Yatung--rights which had been passed down from the Conventions of 1904 and 1906 which the British had signed with the Tibetans.

However, the buffer state of Tibet that had existed between India and China for over two thousand years had suddenly disappeared. Now two large and powerful nations with completely different systems of government and different set of values faced each other across a long, inhospitable border. By 1957, there was public disagreement between India and China on the border issue. ¹ China refused to honor any border demarkation that had been concluded between Tibet and British India-- she was especially against the boundary laid down in the Simla Convention of 1914, which the Chinese never recognized nor ratified. Disputes over Chinese and Indian maps, particularly with respect to the border between Tibet and India's Northeast Frontier Province (NEFA), were felt immediately after the Chinese military occupation of Tibet.

As the years went by, the Chinese built, without Indian knowledge, a strategic highway linking Tibet to Sinkiang province through Indian territory. When the Chinese finally disclosed information about the building of this highway across Indian territory, the Indian government lodged strong protests. It was, however, too late, and China was by this time ready to alienate India to support her claims. The deterioration and ultimate downfall of Sino-Indian relationship was well underway.

THE OCCUPATION

Soon after the Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed, the Tibetan Delegation in Peking informed the Dalai Lama at Yatung that the Chinese government had appointed General Chang Ching-wu as their representative in Lhasa, and Director General of the military headquarters in Tibet. He was coming to Lhasa via India and as such would meet the Dalai Lama as soon as he entered Tibet. Tibetan officials had been speculating, ever since the agreement had been signed, whether or not the Dalai Lama should go to India for safety before it was too late, but now all had reached an agreement that His Holiness should wait until the Chinese general came, before making that decision.

General Chang left Peking on June 23, 1951 and arrived at Yatung on July 14. He had a conference with the Dalai Lama on July 16, in which he gave him a letter from Mao Tse-tung. It was a cordial meeting, and General Chang, through his interpreters, welcomed Tibet back to the great motherland, a phrase which the Dalai Lama had come to detest. It has been reported that during this conference the Dalai Lama got his first look at the text of the Seventeen-Point Agreement from General Chang, whom the Dalai Lama found to be a friendly and informal man.

Immediately after this conference, General Chang left for Lhasa. The concrete results of this meeting have not been revealed.

In Lhasa, General Chang was given a befitting welcome according to the instructions the Dalai Lama had sent from Yatung. The following day, the Prime Ministers and the Cabinet gave a dinner party in Chang's honor, but that did not satisfy him. He complained that he had not been extended the protocol due the representative of the central government. So the disagreement between the Chinese representative and the Tibetan officials started as soon as the Chinese arrived in Lhasa. This immediate disagreement between the Tibetan officials and the Chinese general compelled the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa.

On July 29, the Dalai Lama left Yatung and returned to Lhasa. He arrived in Lhasa on the August 17, 1951, and from there His Holiness witnessed the extension of the Chinese occupation of his country. On September 9, 1951, three thousand officers and men of the PLA under General Wang Chi-mei marched into Lhasa. A month later, this force was reinforced by 20,000 regulars of the PLA under the commands of Generals Chang Kuo-hua and Tan Kuan-san.⁶ Within days of their arrival, there was havoc in the city. The Chinese demanded supplies and accommodation, and they took possession of an enormous area southwest of the Norbulinka on the banks of the Lhasa river. They demanded a loan of 2000 tons of barley and other kinds of food as well, which broke the back of the fragile economy of Lhasa. Inflation soared and for the first time in memory, the people of Lhasa were reduced to the edge of famine.⁷

Lukhangwa, the Tibetan lay Prime Minister, had acted as a balance between the essential needs of the people and the requests of the Chinese.

He had told the Chinese that the food production of Tibet was just sufficient for their own need and there was little surplus, perhaps enough to support the Chinese armies for another month or two, but no more. He also objected to the presence of the unusually large Chinese contingent in Lhasa. General Chang Ching-wu politely told Lukhangwa that the Tibetan government was obliged by the Seventeen-Point Agreement to provide accommodation and supplies to the Chinese. The burning of animal bones by the Chinese within the confines of Lhasa also caused a great number of complaints and hostile comments from the Tibetans. Then the Chinese complained that the people were going about in the streets of Lhasa singing songs of disparagement of the Chinese, and wanted it stopped. In this manner, Chinese complaints grew more numerous and forceful.

This situation was aggravated all over Tibet because the Chinese lived on the local food production which even under normal circumstances was barely enough to sustain the local population. Resentment was immediate and displayed even by children in the streets of Lhasa. Complaints poured into the offices of the Tibetan Cabinet, but nothing could be done as the Chinese would not only refuse to help the Tibetans, but also continuously increased their demands for more food. This was the first issue that brought Chinese officials in conflict with Tibetan officials all over most of Tibet.

In eastern Tibet, the Chinese were doing somewhat better. Chinese Communist cadres had been so well behaved that it amazed the people of Kham. These cadres immediately started to exploit the Khampas' old grudge against Lhasa, and advocated that they had come to reassert the autonomy of Kham and to build up the region under the leadership of the

Khampas. The communists also assured them that there would be no change in the status of the lords and the priests. To prove their point, this was followed by positive actions like returning the captured Khampa levies along with their weapon, no looting and no bad conduct by the Chinese troops. For the time being at least, all their words and actions had won over the people of Kham.

The Chinese also organised the People's Liberation Committee of Chamdo which abolished the bureaucratic system of the former government of Lhasa. Chamdo began to emerge as a major political and administrative center. Ngabo nominally headed the Chamdo government, but the territory was brought under the effective rule of the local Chinese military authority. By early 1952, Chamdo was in effect completely independent of Lhasa. However, the arrival of Han settlers in Chamdo in the early 1950s had generated considerable hostility against the Chinese.

On October 24, 1951, the Dalai Lama ratified the Seventeen-Point Agreement as he was convinced that this was the best deal the Tibetans would ever get from the Chinese. By December, the Chinese army had deployed to set up checkpoints along the border with Bhutan. By February 1952, the Tibet Military Area Headquarters was established, and a branch of the People's Bank of China opened in Lhasa. On March 13, 1952, Chinese army units entered the border town of Yatung after they had set up guards and checkpoints all along the trade route from Gyantse to Yatung. The Chinese were quickly occupying the border areas as well as introducing Chinese agencies into Tibet. Around April, the communists began to assert their authority more directly, and even started to undermine the powers of the Dalai Lama to some extent.

Finally, a crisis between the Chinese and Prime Minister Lukhangwa arose over the issue of the Tibetan army being absorbed into the PLA, in accordance with the Seventeen-Point Agreement. General Chang Ching-wu had convened a meeting and announced that the time had come for the Tibetan troops to be absorbed into the PLA. At this, Lukhangwa stated that the Tibetans could not accept the Seventeen-Point Agreement because the Chinese had repeatedly broken its terms. The crisis ended only when the Dalai Lama, under Chinese duress and with his Cabinet's recommendation, asked both his Prime Ministers to resign. The Kashag was also ordered to dissolve its Foreign Affairs Bureau, and was replaced by body called the¹² Lhasa Foreign Affairs Office which was controlled by Peking. As a result of these actions and pressures, the Chinese slowly but surely extended their political and military control over Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

The next step in the erosion of the Dalai Lama's powers came on April 28, 1952. The Panchen Lama was brought to Lhasa under the auspices of the PLA. Although this man had never previously been in Tibet and was not even recognised as the real candidate for the Panchen Lama, he did, however, have consultations with the Dalai Lama, and on June 9, 1952 left for his seat of power, the Tashilhunpo monastery at Shigatse. The Panchen Lama had strong backing from the Chinese, and his power and role in Tibetan affairs was slowly increased. By elevating the status of his chief rival, the Chinese further undermined the powers of the Dalai Lama.

Another important international event to grant China the right to occupy Tibet came in the form of a treaty with India. The Chinese had closed Tibet to Indian businessmen and pilgrims after they occupied the country, and Indian missions had been shut down. After minor protests

coming from the Indian government, a meeting was convened in late 1953 to discuss these problems. This meeting ended with the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet of April 29, 1954. This treaty was concerned mainly with economic relations and transit of pilgrims between India and Tibet, and particularly the improvement of facilities for merchants and pilgrims of both countries. The treaty was preceded by the widely publicised Indian intention to give up extra territorial rights in Tibet which India had acquired as a legacy from the British. The Indians were also ready to make a gift to the Chinese of their postal, telegraph, telephone and rest-house facilities if the Chinese paid a reasonable price for them. On the day following the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement, the Indian government waived payment as a gesture of goodwill. Under this agreement, India officially recognised China's sovereignty over Tibet.

By 1954, Tibet had been effectively divided into three administrative areas.¹³ The eastern region of Kham had become an independent region controlled by the local military authority. The Panchen Lama exercised authority over most of western Tibet from his seat in Shigatse. The remaining central region, which included Lhasa, was still under the Dalai Lama's authority.

In the Autumn of 1954, the Dalai Lama was invited to visit China, and he decided to go, hoping to discuss the plight of the Tibetans with the highest Chinese officials. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa in the beginning of August, travelling overland to Chengtu on the new roads the Chinese were building. He then flew to Sian, where he was joined by the Panchen Lama who was also going to Peking.

They were received in Peking by Premier Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and other officials. Here, the Dalai Lama met Mao Tse-tung, who welcomed him

by saying that he was glad that Tibet had come back to the Motherland and that the Dalai Lama had agreed to take part in the Chinese National Assembly. Mao also informed the Dalai Lama of the decision to set up a Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet.¹⁴ This was another major step taken by the Chinese in their occupation of Tibet, and it further neutralised the powers of the Dalai Lama.

The decision to set up a Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet had been authorised by the Chinese State Council in March, 1955. On April 22, 1956, this committee was established in Lhasa. Of the fifty-one members of the committee, fifteen represented the local Tibetan government and was under the Dalai Lama, ten were from the Panchen Kanpo Liza and controlled by the Panchen Lama and ten from the People's Liberation Committee of the Chamdo area. In addition, there were five members from the cadres of the CPG working in the Tibet area, and eleven others representing major monasteries, religious sects and public bodies. With the Dalai Lama as the Chairman, the Panchen Lama as the Vice-Chairman, General Chang Kuo-hua as deputy and Ngabo Nawang Jigme as the Secretary General, the committee was to function as the central administrative organ of Tibet, deriving its authority from, and dependent on, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in all respects. The formal chairmanship of the committee by the Dalai Lama was no restraint to the Chinese, the majority of committee members were sponsored by, and under the control of, the Chinese. Moreover, the most important decisions were made by the Chinese Communist Party of Tibet, in which Tibetans were not represented. The Preparatory Committee established several subordinate administrative agencies which handled

all dealings with civil administration, finance, health, the judiciary, agriculture, trade and industry, transportation and construction. These were also dominated by Han Chinese. By a clever and calculated move, the Chinese had successfully transformed the traditional religious and secular leaders of Tibet into powerless puppets.¹⁵

Before the Dalai Lama had even left Tibet on his way to Peking in 1954, resentment against the Chinese in eastern Tibet had reached a breaking point. On August 20, 1954, a week before the Dalai Lama reached Yaan in Szechwan province, rebellion broke out in southern Kham. Hearing that the Dalai Lama was passing through Kham en route to Peking, some Khampas even planned to kidnap him, and the Chinese took extraordinary measures to protect the Dalai Lama.¹⁶ While the Dalai Lama was in Peking from September, 1954 to March, 1955, this rebellion spread all over Kham. On his return journey to Tibet, when the Dalai Lama passed through Chamdo in April, 1955, he noticed that the PLA controlled everything, resentment was boiling, and he heard of much oppression and many injustices, such as, peasants depossessed of land and broken promises. Rumors that the Chinese were about to disarm the Khampas also alarmed the Dalai Lama.¹⁷

By February, 1956, resentment against the Chinese also flared up in Lhasa and the Chinese ordered the Tibetans to repress it. During the Monlan Festival celebrating the Tibetan New Year, leaders chosen by the people voiced their resentment by distributing pamphlets demanding that the Chinese go and leave Tibet to Tibetans. Under Chinese pressure, three of the leaders were arrested and jailed by the Tibetan government, and while one died in captivity, the other two were released only when the three great monasteries of Lhasa stood surety for their behavior. While

these events were occurring in Lhasa, the situation in Chamdo had turned even more hostile.

The continuous flare up of fighting at various places had forced the Chinese commanding general at Chamdo to call a meeting of about 350 leading Tibetan personalities immediately after the Monlam Festival of 1956. When the question was thrown open as to whether communist reforms should be introduced, the majority voted never to have reforms, and the meeting ended with the Chinese general acting exceptionally polite. Within a month, another similar meeting was called at the great fortress of Jomdho Dzong. When all had assembled, the fort was surrounded by Chinese troops. Then the military commander announced that reforms would be introduced immediately in Chamdo, and he asked all those present to ratify his decision. For ten days, the Tibetans remained adamant, but then seeing how hopeless the situation was, they decided to trick the Chinese and escape. By the fifteenth day, all the delegates verbally agreed that the reforms should be introduced, and were told that beginning the next day they would begin a course of fresh political instructions. That night, as a result of the apparent agreement, the guards were fewer and more relaxed. Armed with knives and a few pistols, the Khampas killed the sentries and made a break for freedom. About two hundred managed to escape and fled into the mountains. This marked the beginning of the Tibetan uprising.

The Dalai Lama had heard of this incident and was feeling very dejected when in June, 1956, he received an invitation from the Mahabodhi Society of India to come and attend the 2500th anniversary of the birth of Lord Buddha. When consulted, the acting senior Chinese government rep-

representative at the time, General Fan Ming, told the Dalai Lama that he would not be allowed to attend the celebration for reasons of security, as well as the fact that, as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, he needed to stay in order to oversee the great amount of work to be done. He suggested that the Dalai Lama appoint a deputy to go in his place. However, on the first or second of November, the Dalai Lama was informed by General Fan Ming that he and the Panchen Lama had been invited by the Indian government as its guests, and as such, he could go. Before he left Lhasa, the Dalai Lama was given a long lecture, like a schoolboy, by General Chang Ching-wu, who had returned as the permanent Chinese representative to Tibet, on the merits of communism and the possibility of being influenced by foreign imperialists. General Chang also told the Dalai Lama not to attend any function attended by representatives from Formosa, that he was to say nothing about the Indo-Tibetan frontier, and that the situation in Tibet was normal.¹⁹ The Dalai Lama was escorted to the border with Sikkim by a Chinese general who continually reminded the Dalai Lama that he would be representing the Chinese as well as the Tibetans.

In India, the Dalai Lama told the Indian Prime Minister that since he felt that he could no longer do anything for his people, he had decided not to return to Tibet until he saw a positive sign of a change in Chinese policy. However, Mr. Nehru advised the Dalai Lama not to resist the Chinese and to go back and work peacefully to try to carry out the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Mr. Nehru also promised to talk to Chou En-lai who was coming to Delhi the next day, about the problems of the Tibetans.²⁰ Personal discussions with Chou En-lai only yielded sympathetic remarks

about the possibilities of the local Chinese officials in Tibet making mistakes. Chou En-lai then approached the Dalai Lama's elder brothers, who were also in New Delhi at the time, and asked them to convince the Dalai Lama to go back for the good of the Tibetans. While the Dalai Lama was in pilgrimage to holy Buddhist shrines in India, a message from General Chang Ching-wu from Lhasa asked him to return as soon as possible because of an impending revolution. Chou then called the Dalai Lama back to Delhi where he told him to go back immediately because of the worsening situation in Tibet. Because of the explosive situation in his country, the Dalai Lama agreed to return to Tibet.

When the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in early 1957, he found that Tibetan resentment against the Chinese had risen so drastically that trouble was imminent over all of Tibet. Many factors, like inflation, Han domination, forced labor to build military roads, broken promises and unpopular reforms, were responsible for the resentment, but the most significant was the flow of Khampa refugees to Lhasa. These refugees, numbering several thousands, told of Chinese atrocities in eastern Tibet, and all were afraid that these methods would soon be used all over Tibet. The Chinese also announced that revolt had broken out in the east, and that they would use every means to suppress this uprising.

By late 1957, the province of Kham had been in revolt for two years. Similarly, in Amdo, the Goloks and the Amdowas had risen against the Chinese to protest forced labor and unpopular reforms. The Chinese had tried to suppress this rebellion and failed, and as a result, on April 22, 1957-- the first anniversary of the formation of the Preparatory Commission-- a government decree announced that social reforms in

Tibet would be postponed till 1962. However, throughout 1957 and 1958, the Chinese continued using force to suppress guerilla activities in Kham and Amdo. This led to a continuous stream of refugees coming to and camping around Lhasa. The Chinese never kept their word of postponing the reforms in Kham and Amdo, and so the fighting escalated in these regions.

The Chinese were reported to have bombed villages and monasteries²² in Kham. Finally, in late 1958, the Chinese ordered the Tibetan Cabinet to send Tibetan troops to crush the revolt in the east, which the Cabinet firmly refused. This refusal was the breaking point in relations between the Tibetan officials and the Chinese officials. By March, 1959, the Chinese had accused the Cabinet of being in league with the dissidents, and at the same time, the dissidents refused to trust any word of the Chinese.²³

In their occupation of Tibet, the Chinese focused on two things. The rapid militarisation of Tibet became the prime concern of China, and it was carried out efficiently and at times, harshly. Another Chinese aim was the slow undermining of the limited autonomy granted to the Tibetans by the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Once they had consolidated their power in Tibet, the Chinese made no secret of these intentions. Both these actions led directly to growing resentment within Tibet. Within three years of their occupation, the Chinese were faced with continuous rebellion by a disgruntled and fierce populace. The Tibetans made one final, and fatal, attempt to stop the growth of Chinese influence early in 1959.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE TIBETAN UPRISING OF 1959

By 1956, reports of revolts in the east were admitted by the Chi-

nese. During the next two years, this revolt in the east not only worsened, but also spread over into Tsinghai province and the central part of Tibet, both by design and as a result of the people fleeing the Chinese atrocities in suppression of the revolt. By the end of 1958, the resistance in Jeykundo had been put down, and the defeated guerillas had headed for Lhasa under Chime Youngdung, the son of their assassinated leader. ²⁴ When they arrived in Lhasa on February 13, 1959, they melted into the tens of thousands of Khampas who had come in before them and now were camped around Lhasa.

Life in Lhasa was becoming worse. Food was becoming increasingly scarce. The Chinese atrocities were increasing, and so was their propaganda against the Tibetan Cabinet. Tension between the Chinese authorities and the Cabinet reached a climax when the Chinese discovered that they were being given false information about the Khampa guerillas by the Tibetan Prime Minister, Surkhang. Finally, on February 24, 1959, a Chinese general named Chang Hwa-ting defected in favor of the Tibetans. When the Chinese demanded the return of this man, the Kashag denied all knowledge of his whereabouts. As a result, General Tan Kuan-san, the Chinese commander, gave them one week to return the general or face dire consequences. ²⁵ When the deadline expired, the Chinese took no action against the Tibetans.

On March 3, while the Dalai Lama was engaged in a dialectical debate, which was part of his final examination for the Master of Metaphysics, before a vast audience of monks and lamas in Lhasa, he was informed by a monk called Gyantso Ling, a man whose loyalty towards the Chinese was known to all, that two Chinese officers wanted to see him. Although it was very unusual that two junior Chinese officers should ap-

proach the person of the Dalai Lama so casually, the Dalai Lama agreed to see them. These officers came straight to the point and informed the Dalai Lama that General Tan Kuan-san had arranged a theatrical performance within the Chinese army camp and wanted the Dalai Lama to name a date when he could conveniently attend. Although the Dalai Lama was astonished that such a trivial affair had been referred directly to him, he promised to go, but could not give a date because he could not make a decision while preparing for the most difficult examination of his life. To his astonishment, these officers were not satisfied with his answer and kept pressing the Dalai Lama to decide on a date at once. Finally, the Dalai Lama repeated firmly that under no circumstances would he discuss the matter before his examinations, and the two officers left to take the message to General Tan.

Although this meeting seemed innocuous, it planted the seed that led to open revolt within a few days. Several questions about this incident have remained unanswered. Was it merely chance that this meeting started the revolt in Tibet or was it a deliberate move by the Chinese to force the Tibetans to violent action which they planned to suppress by force ?

The fact that within a few hours of this incident, Radio Peking announced, without any warning, that the Dalai Lama had agreed to visit Peking made it look more ominous. This broadcast had no foundation because, although the Dalai Lama had been asked to visit the Chinese capital, he had carefully avoided accepting. The coincidence of these events, whether by design or by chance, convinced many people in Lhasa that this was a Chinese plot to force the Dalai Lama to fly out of Tibet against his will.

On March 5, the Dalai Lama made his way in a state procession from Jokhang to the Norbulinka, the Summer Place. This was an annual event and it was customary that Lhasa's small diplomatic corps attend along with high-ranking Chinese. However, this year General Tan had ordered the Chinese to boycott the parade as a sign of displeasure to the Dalai Lama's refusal to give a date to visit the Chinese camp, and for the first time since the Chinese occupation, no Chinese attended this event. Many Tibetans were delighted at the absence of the Chinese at this function, but the Dalai Lama was rather worried that the Chinese had not come. Then on March 7, General Tan again asked the Dalai Lama when he could visit the Chinese camp. Now the Dalai Lama could no longer avoid giving an answer, and he gave the date as March 10, and the stage was set for the final show down.

On the morning of March 9, 1959, the day before the Dalai Lama's visit to the Chinese camp, the Commander of the Dalai Lama's Bodyguard, General Kusung Depon, was summoned to the Chinese headquarters by Brigadier Fu, the Chinese military advisor. When he arrived, he was treated disrespectfully by Fu, and told that no Tibetan soldier was to accompany the Dalai Lama when he came to the Chinese camp and that there was to be none of the ceremony that was usual when the Dalai Lama went somewhere. Kusung was also informed that the whole thing was to be kept secret. When Kusung reported back to the Dalai Lama and his Cabinet, the news of these arrangements quickly spread and within a matter of hours a rumor swept Lhasa that the Chinese were planning to kidnap the Dalai Lama.

By sunset of March 9, thousands of men, women and children had surrounded the Norbulinka to prevent the Dalai Lama from leaving the palace. The Indian, Nepalese and Bhutanese Consulates were besieged, and

petitions made to the consuls to cable New Delhi for help. That evening, two Chinese officers who brought the formal invitation cards to the Norbulinka, were manhandled by the crowd and had to be rescued by Tibetan troops. It was then discovered that not all high Tibetan officials were invited as was customary. Only six members of the Kashag were to accompany the Dalai Lama, and even these six people were asked not to bring more than one servant with them. Now it certainly looked like the Chinese were planning an abduction, and his most trusted advisors requested the Dalai Lama to cancel his visit, but he refused fearing that by not going, he would give the Chinese an excuse to use force against the Tibetans.

When the morning of March 10 dawned, the Norbulinka was surrounded by Tibetans who had come to stop the Chinese from taking the Dalai Lama to the camp. The same morning, Chinese soldiers had gone to fetch the Dalai Lama's mother to the military camp, but they were dissuaded by her fierce Khampa servants who told them that she was sick. However, the Dalai Lama's youngest brother had already been taken at dawn from the Drepung monastery and was already inside the camp. From early morning, the huge crowd outside the Norbulinka chanted slogans making it clear that they were determined to prevent the Dalai Lama from visiting the Chinese camp. At about nine o'clock, a Tibetan minister drove up to the Norbulinka on a jeep and was escorted by a Chinese officer. Since this minister was a new one, the crowd thought that the Chinese officer with him had come to fetch the Dalai Lama and attacked him. The minister was injured in this incident. The Dalai Lama's advisors now told him flatly that he should not go to the Chinese camp. The outbreak of violence distressed the Dalai Lama, and he decided not to attend the Chinese show.

Meanwhile, Ngabo and Gyamtso, the two collaborators, had already gone to the Chinese camp and awaited the arrival of the Dalai Lama.

Around eleven o'clock, the Dalai Lama's senior Chamberlain, Phala, telephoned General Tan's interpreter and informed him that the Dalai Lama had cancelled the visit and expressed his regrets. The cabinet members were also instructed to inform the crowd about this decision by the Dalai Lama. Although the crowd greeted the news with joy, it did not disperse as the Dalai Lama had hoped. Later in the morning, a monastic official named Phakpala Kenchung, who was known to have close associations with the Chinese, was stoned to death by the crowd when he tried to enter the Norbulinka. At about one o'clock, the Dalai Lama sent three ministers to the Chinese headquarters to explain to General Tan Kuan-san why he was unable to attend the show.

The meeting with General Tan was an ominous meeting. The General was so infuriated that he did not hide his temper and in an abusive way threatened to crush the uprising. He also charged the Tibetan government with arming the Khampas. The Tibetans were told to be prepared as the Chinese would now act. Finally, General Tan told Luishar, who was the Tibetan head of security, unless he produced within three days the people that had killed Phakpala, he would be publicly hanged. From the beginning of this meeting, which lasted more than two hours, Ngabo had been present. He never spoke a word, and apparently did not disagree with the Chinese.

When this delegation returned to the Norbulinka at about five in the evening and informed the Dalai Lama about the events that had occurred, he was deeply troubled. In the meantime, the uprising had spread all over the city, and the crowds at various meetings in Lhasa burned copies of the Seventeen-Point Agreement.

At about six in the evening, seventy-odd members of the government inside the Norbulingka, mostly junior officials and members of the Dalai Lama's bodyguard, staged a demonstration and endorsed the declarations which had been made at the meeting in Lhasa that the Chinese leave Tibet to the Tibetans. The Cabinet met until late in the night and decided that the Dalai Lama should be prepared to leave Lhasa if the situation worsened. The Senior Chamberlain, Phala was given complete power to make any plan he thought fit for the Dalai Lama's escape. The only good news of March 10, 1959 was that the Dalai Lama's youngest brother, Choegyal had been released by the Chinese. That same evening, Chime Youngdung was persuaded by Khampa leaders to leave Lhasa for his own security. Finally, the Monk Gyamtso brought a letter from General Tan to the Dalai Lama, and somehow managed to get through the self-appointed guards outside the Norbulingka.³² In this letter, the Dalai Lama was invited to take refuge in the Chinese camp because General Tan was concerned for his safety.

The next few days were heavy with tension and there was a remarkable increase in military activity by the Chinese. By March 11, the Lhasan people had become even more difficult to control. The leaders of the crowd still surrounding the Norbulingka posted guards outside the Cabinet office inside the Norbulingka compound and informed the Cabinet members that none of them would be allowed to leave the Norbulingka because they suspected that the Cabinet would take some sort of a compromise to the Chinese which might be against the people's wish. The Cabinet convened an emergency meeting at which it decided to make another effort to persuade the people to call off their demonstration. It was during discussions with the leaders of the crowd surrounding the Norbulingka that General Tan's second letter to the Dalai Lama arrived with a separate letter for the Kashag. The letter to

the Kashag asked the Cabinet to order the people to remove the barricades that had been set up on the north side of Lhasa. When the Cabinet assembled the leaders and asked them to comply so that the Chinese could not find any more excuse for more repression, the leaders flatly refused and said that the as Chinese had set up barricades to fortify their garrisons, they had done so to protect the Norbulingka. Even though the Dalai Lama himself requested these leaders to comply with the Cabinet's decision, they refused to withdraw their guards at the palace. The next few days dragged on without any change in the situation. On March 16th, General Tan's third and last letter arrived along with a letter written by Ngabo.

Ngabo's letter warned the Dalai Lama that there was little hope of peace and urged the Dalai Lama to send a sketch map showing exactly which building he was living in because if General Tan knew his exact location, the Chinese would certainly avoid damaging this building.

Ngabo also wrote a letter to the Kashag with the same proposal. The Dalai Lama replied to General Tan trying to comply with all his wishes in the hope of avoiding bloodshed, and also informed the General that he would come to the Chinese camp, but only after the crowd had dispersed.

The people outside the Norbulingka had now armed themselves with whatever they could muster. The Chinese had also brought all their artillery in the district within range of Lhasa, and heavy machine guns had been brought to Lhasa from all around. Chinese military personnel were seen taking measurements near the palace, apparently ranging their artillery pieces. Furthermore, rumors of fresh troop arrivals from China were spreading quickly. By the night of the 16th, the people were certain that the Chinese were about to shell the Norbulingka, but they refused to leave the palace and abandon the Dalai Lama. Their fury against the Chinese had become uncontrol-

lable and they would not listen to anyone.

When the morning of the 17th came, rumors ran rampant, and violence seemed imminent. The Dalai Lama convened his Cabinet to discuss ways to prevent the destruction of the Norbulingka and the inevitable massacre which would follow. The guards set up by the people had become so strict that they even censored letters leaving the Palace. Finally a letter to Ngabo in the Chinese camp was smuggled out and delivered to him. In this letter, the Cabinet requested Ngabo to appeal to General Tan not to use force to disperse the crowd and to wait till the Cabinet tried again to persuade them to leave in peace. This letter also suggested that Ngabo should help the Cabinet to evacuate the Dalai Lama to the Chinese camp and warned him of the difficulties that he would encounter in trying to do so. Ngabo sent a brief acknowledgement in which he expressed his pleasure at the Cabinet's proposal to evacuate the Dalai Lama to the Chinese camp and promised to send a detailed answer later; that answer however did not come until too late.

Around four o'clock that afternoon, while the Dalai Lama was discussing Ngabo's reply with his minister, the Chinese fired two heavy mortar rounds. One of them fell within the Palace grounds and the other landed in the marshy grounds outside the northern gate. ³⁴ The impending disaster which these two shots signalled forced the Dalai Lama to begin immediate preparations to flee Lhasa.


Preparations for his departure were undertaken almost immediately according to the plan prepared by Phala. At about nine o'clock, while the Dalai Lama's family had already secretly left Lhasa, Chinese searchlights searched the streets seeking for trouble-makers. At this moment, with still an hour remaining before the Dalai Lama left the Norbulingka, a massive

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sandstorm, the worst that Lhasa had known hit the city. Phala was relieved that a natural screen had finally neutralised the Chinese searchlights. Around nine thirty, the Dalai Lama dressed up as a simple soldier, and went to his prayer room for the last time and read the Scriptures until he reached a passage in which the Buddha had told his disciples to take courage. He then turned down the lights and walked out. As arranged by Phala, the Dalai Lama was given a rifle at the inner gate and he slung it over his shoulder and headed for the main gate. Phala announced at the gate that he was making a tour of inspection and then walked out of the gate with the normal escort of soldiers, in which the Dalai Lama was hidden. With the sand deadening their footsteps, they passed the Tibetan guards unchallenged and headed for the river beyond.³⁶

After 13 days of suspense and an extremely gruelling journey, the Dalai Lama and his party of about 80 people reached the Indian frontier post of Chutangmo, some forty miles from the northeast corner of Bhutan, on 30th of March. It had been a forced march with the spectre of Chinese pursuit constantly hanging over their heads. However, the escape route was bravely covered by guerilla decoys and false trails, and as such was unknown to the Chinese till the 29th of March. Furthermore, twenty miles from Lhasa, the Dalai Lama's entourage was met by Khampa guerillas who had come to act as the security force. These Khampas did engage the Chinese at the ferry-site on the Tsangpo river and foiled a Chinese attempt to cut off the Dalai Lama's escape route.³⁷ (See Map VIII for the Dalai Lama's escape route.)

For two days, the Chinese and most Tibetans did not realise that the Dalai Lama had fled. It was late in the afternoon of the 19th that the Chinese got some information and acted. The Chinese sent officers to the Nepalese, Bhutanese and Indian consulates to search for the Dalai Lama. The



Source:- The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 184

Indian consul was advised to evacuate the consulate as quickly as possible-- this has been translated by many as an indication of the Chinese intention to shell Lhasa. ³⁸ Then at six o'clock in the evening of March 19, the leaders of the people were called to an assembly where the news of the Dalai Lama's flight was flashed through a letter which the Dalai Lama had left behind. This letter requested the people not to open fire unless they were attacked. March 19th ended quietly, with an air of suspense at what the morning would bring. ³⁹

In the early hours of March 20, 1959, at about 2 A.M. in the morning, the Chinese started to shell Lhasa. By morning, the city had been surrounded by tanks and every important crossroads was manned by Chinese machinegun nests. Despite such odds, fighting and resistance broke out all over Lhasa. Pitched battles were fought all over the city and the Chinese fired on unarmed demonstrators at the Chinese Transportation Center killing a number of innocent women. ⁴⁰ The Chinese also shelled the Norbulingka, the Potala Palace, several monasteries and the Jokhang, the holiest shrine in Tibet. Even the official residence of the Indian consul general, which was located between the Norbulingka and the Potala, was hit, although it had not been evacuated. Fighting continued all night and throughout March 21, but the overwhelming odds in favor of the Chinese were beginning to tell by the end of March 20, 1959.

By the 22nd, the Chinese had succeeded in putting down the Lhasa revolt, but the official casualty figures were never released by the Chinese. Estimates have been as high as several thousand Chinese and an equal number of Tibetans killed in 3 days of fighting, but a more reasonable estimate of Tibetans killed has been put at some 4000 dead. On March 28, the New China News Agency claimed that by the 23rd, more than four thou-

sand prisoners had been taken, eight thousand different kinds of small arms, eighty light and heavy machine-guns, twenty-seven 81-mm mortars, six⁴¹ mountain guns and ten million bullets were captured. The fighting in Lhasa completely died down after General Tan and Ngabo spoke over the loud-speakers at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd asking everybody to lay down their arms. Ngabo's speech had a great impact because of his position as a member of the Kashag, and the remaining rebels took their belongings⁴² and headed for the hills, leaving behind a dead Lhasa.

Throughout the nine turbulent years of Chinese occupation, the Dalai Lama's government had functioned under increasing pressure from the Chinese and tried to maintain the limited autonomy granted by the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Hunger, forced labor, interference in the religious customs of the Tibetans, unpopular reforms and continuous undermining of the Dalai Lama's authority alienated the Tibetans and forced them to rise up against the occupation force. Despite the Dalai Lama's laborious attempts to avoid giving the Chinese an opportunity to use force, nine years of pent-up fury erupted into a violent uprising in March 1959, and forced the Dalai Lama to go into exile.

This was the end of Tibetan autonomy and the beginning of total Chinese rule in Tibet. A mass exodus of Tibetan refugees into India primarily due to the Chinese retaliations against the 1959 uprising demonstrated Chinese resolve to control Tibet. India's granting of political asylum to the Dalai Lama and support of the Tibetan cause also began the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations. Within three years, this deterioration would result in a war between the two countries.

CHAPTER V

THE INVASION AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

When the Chinese invaded Tibet in 1950, relations between China and India were good, but their friendship was less than a year old. Various circumstances had helped foster good relationship between them, but the association had not yet withstood the test of time. It was India's exceptional quest for friendship with China that had been responsible for making possible such good relations in this early period, but equally important was China's isolation in the world. Moreover, the fact that India had gained independence just three years earlier and that China had a new government made them feel insecure and also helped draw these two countries together. The British withdrawal from India had also left a massive power vacuum in the region, and neither India nor China felt strong enough to fill this gap alone; thus friendship made them both feel more secure. The situation in the region was very fragile and uncertain. Even though Indian interests within Tibet were opposed to Chinese intentions towards Tibet, friendship between these two countries continued to improve.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet did three things which had a significant impact on Sino-Indian relations. For the first time in history China and India had a common border, the effect of which no one could be sure of. Second, and related to the previous factor, the rapid militarisation of the Tibetan plateau had brought thousands of Chinese troops to the northern border of India.¹ Lastly, the Chinese invasion directly tested India's commitment to Tibet.

These three factors brought about by the Chinese invasion of Tibet forecast strained relations between India and China; surprisingly, however, despite these ominous signals, Sino-Indian relations prospered for five years before turning sour.

THE NEW BEGINNING

During the late 1940's dramatic changes occurred both in India and China, the end result being the emergence of two new governments after almost half a century of struggle and sacrifice. However, whereas a new democracy had come to power in India, a militant communist government had emerged victorious in China. Indian leaders had been so tempered by the sacrifice and struggle for independence that they responded with enthusiasm to the awakening of other Asian nations, and viewed the Chinese communist revolution as a welcome link in the chain of revolutions sweeping Asia. Wishing to live in peace with her newly-formed, yet powerful, neighbor, India was willing to accept China as an integral part of the Asian family. India hoped that both she and the world would benefit from friendship and peaceful co-existence with this new force in world politics. India was therefore among the first nations to recognise the communist² government in China.

The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, had long been suspicious of Indian "imperialist" designs, and voiced this suspicion openly long before coming to power in China. Following the communist victory in 1949, the Chinese, therefore, remained cautious of Indian overtures of friendship; however, various factors like the Korean War and Chinese isolation throughout 1950 drew the two countries closer together.

When Chairman Mao Tse-tung's New Year's message for the liberation

of Tibet coincided with the complete withdrawal of the British from India in January of 1950, there was no response from India. India was aware of the fact that there could be no real and lasting solutions to any Asian problems without the participation and consent of China. For this reason, India hoped to moderate China's hostility to the rest of the world, reduce China's dependence on the Soviet Union and normalise the situation in the Far East. The Chinese leaders for their part aimed at consolidating their power within China, reducing the effectiveness and impact of the quarantine imposed by the United States, and reestablishing the status of China as a regional and world power. India was seen as a possible contributor to all these goals, and China was therefore willing to befriend India-- at least for the time being.

Diplomatic relations between China and India were established on April 1, 1950, and the friendship grew by the day. On May 5, 1950, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in a message broadcast by the United Nations radio network, declared that two thousand years of friendship between China and India would help them understand each other and so India would endeavor to maintain friendly relations with China. This initiative to build friendly ties was given an unexpected boost by the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950.

India was one of the few non-communist nations that had an embassy in Peking when the Korean conflict started. Adhering to a policy of non-alignment, India became accepted as the Western Power's contact in Peking. India used this great diplomatic opportunity to good advantage by mediating between the opposing forces. The Indian Ambassador in Peking had been personally notified on the night of October 2, 1950, of

Chinese intentions to intervene in Korea if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel. He sent this dire warning to New Delhi which forwarded it to the Western alliance; but the West chose to ignore this warning and China subsequently entered the Korean War. However, before she intervened in Korea, China invaded Tibet on October 7, 1950, embarrassing India before the world community.

China had ignored all Indian requests and warnings not to invade Tibet when she sent her army into Tibet.⁴ The world press ridiculed Prime Minister Nehru and suggested that Americans understood the working of the "Asian Mind" better than Nehru and that Indian diplomacy looked like a "rope trick" that had not worked.⁵ Although India had been warned of Chinese intentions to go into Tibet, no effective deterrent had been issued India.

When the invasion did come, India lodged formal protests, but China's angry assertion that Tibet was an integral part of China and as such, any activity inside Tibet was China's internal problem, went unchallenged by India. The possibility of a break in Sino-Indian relations was avoided by the fact that Nehru attached greater importance to China's friendship than to the various interests and ties between India and Tibet. In fact, at this time India went one step further to befriend China.

From the beginning of the impending Chinese invasion, India showed a callousness to Tibetan appeals for fear of alienating China. Telling the Tibetans not to offer armed resistance to the Chinese and that military supplies from India would not be guaranteed was one classic example of India's pro-Chinese policy.⁶ The ultimate show of friendship for China came when the Indian delegate at the United Nations success-

fully prevented the Tibetan issue from being included in the agenda of the General Assembly. India's unwillingness to support Tibet in her fight against the Chinese invasion, despite her obligations and interests, must have been a clear invitation to the Chinese government to proceed with its invasion and occupation plans.

After 1950, frequent and close contacts continued between India and China. India's silent acceptance of the Seventeen-Point Agreement between China and Tibet clarified any lingering doubts as to whether India still clung to any of its claims in Tibet. India had officially recognised that, from the day this Agreement was signed, the Chinese would be in charge of the defense and foreign affairs of Tibet.⁷ Overriding concern for friendship with China once again had taken precedence over historical treaties and religious ties with Tibet.

THE RISE OF FRIENDSHIP

Beginning with an unofficial goodwill mission from India in September of 1951, a number of friendly intercourses took place between China and India. These included the first Chinese cultural delegation to India in October 1951, the Rice Agreement of May 1952 and the Indian government's role in mediating the Korean War. While all these exchanges were occurring, the initial signs of trouble in Sino-Indian relations began to crop up unobtrusively as early as 1951. The main irritant from the very beginning seemed to be the Indo-Tibetan border.


Chinese maps issued during the Kuomintang era showed large territories claimed and even administered by India, both in the north-east and the north-west of India, as belonging to China. These maps were later republished by Peking.⁸ Whenever the Indians drew the attention of the

Chinese authorities to this matter, they were told to ignore those maps⁹ as they were old maps which the new regime had not yet corrected. The Indo-Tibetan border, however, was slowly becoming the main topic of concern, and cartographical errors were beginning to be noticed. Nevertheless, the Indian government deliberately downplayed these errors because friendship with China was the main issue of the early 1950's.

Various factors during 1953-1954 brought India and China even closer. First of all, the necessity of an agreement to ensure Indian trade¹⁰ and pilgrimage in Tibet gave reason for convening a meeting in 1953. This meeting ended with the signing of the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse in Tibet. (See Appendix D for the text of this treaty). This treaty regulated trade and cultural relations between India and the "Tibet region of China". India had unilaterally accepted China's position in Tibet and the question of the Indo-Tibetan border was not even addressed. However, the undefined border of thousands of miles stretching from the north-eastern peaks of the Himalayas to the desolate extremity of Ladakh in the north-west was becoming a potential source of conflict (See Maps IX, IXa, and IXb for details of the border). Once again Nehru had accepted Chinese¹¹ assurances of good faith and good conduct and neglected historical facts.


India considered the border well demarcated by treaty and usage, in the north-east by the well-known MacMahon Line, and in the north-west by the treaty between Kashmir and Tibet. The Chinese, as we shall see later, had other views and calculations. The ink had barely dried on the trade agreement, when the first major border incident jarred Sino-Indian relations to reality.

On July 17, 1954, three months after signing the agreement, the




MAP IX

Source:- Military Review, February 1963, p. 8.



MAP IXa

Source:- Military Review, May 1963, p. 12.



MAP IXb

Source:- Military Review, May 1963, p. 14.

Chinese government protested to New Delhi against the stationing of Indian troops at Wu-je (known as Barahoti to the Indians), an area south-east of Niti Pass. This was the first instance in which the People's Republic of China specifically laid claim to Indian territory lying south of the great Himalayas. By the end of 1954, Chinese claims on territories which had never been in dispute with the Tibetans had become a highly possible reality. Negotiations on this matter began in 1955, but no settlement was ever reached.¹²

Massive United States military aid in 1953 and 1954 to Pakistan, India's number one enemy at the time, brought India and China even closer. The two nations became so close that China insisted on India's presence in the solution of many Far Eastern problems like Korea and Indo-China.¹³ In June 1954, Chou En-lai visited India and the two countries once again reiterated and reaffirmed their friendship. This was followed by an even bigger event-- the Bandung Conference.

The Bandung Conference of independent Asian and African nations in April 1955,¹⁴ marked the high water-mark of Sino-Indian friendship and co-operation. This was another major international event where Nehru successfully sold China into the Afro-Asian fraternity and was yet another significant step by India in pursuing friendship with China. The final communique of the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung incorporated the five principles of peaceful co-existence, which were the basis of the 1954 agreement between India and China. While this was an important event in the chronology of Sino-Indian relations, it was also the last major friendly event between the two.

Strangely enough, during 1957, a high-powered Chinese delegation consisting of Marshals and Generals visited India. Despite all the bor-

der problems, this delegation was allowed by the Indian government to visit every major military installation in India, with orders to "show¹⁵ them everything." Even such an outright show of friendship failed to rally the declining Sino-Indian relationship, and to make matters worse, border violations by the Chinese were beginning to come to the public's attention in India; and the public did not like what it heard.

DECLINE OF FRIENDSHIP

By 1956, the revolt against the Chinese occupation in Tibet, which had started late in 1954, had reached such proportions that China was unable to keep the roads into Tibet from the east and the north open to supply her garrisons in Tibet. In desperation, China decided to build another road from Sinkiang province into Tibet through the sparsely populated western regions of Tibet. Engineer surveys showed that rather than building this road through the Kunlun mountains of China, 500 miles would be saved if it were routed through the desolate Aksai Chin plateau of¹⁶ India. The desolate Aksai Chin was generally uninhabited, and the Chinese, probably expecting to build the road without being detected by the Indian government, decided to take the gamble. Now Chinese interests in Tibet had taken precedence over relations with India.

The first public indications of potential trouble in Sino-Indian relations because of the Aksai Chin issue came from reports of the Head¹⁷ Lama of Ladakh, who visited Tibet in the early summer of 1957. He reported finding evidence of intensive road-building activity between Tibet and Sinkiang province. A few months later, Peking announced the completion of a Tibet-Sinkiang road. This announcement was followed by the publication of a small-scale map giving a rough approximation of the route. The

Indian Ambassador in Peking brought this map to the notice of the Indian¹⁸ authorities in September 1957. The Indian government had a strong suspicion that this road was built through Indian territory, and decided to send two army reconnaissance patrols to the Aksai Chin after the winter of 1957.

These patrols to the Aksai Chin left Kashmir in July 1958. One detachment was captured by the Chinese frontier guards, but another was able to carry out its mission, and New Delhi learned that Chinese troops were firmly entrenched in the Aksai Chin. By now this news had reached the public in India, and public opinion against India's weak bargains in the border issue was becoming more vocal.

On September 8, 1959, in a letter to Nehru, Chou En-lai claimed that the border between India and China had never been demarcated, and he insisted that in settling the problem, the historical background of British aggression in China, during British rule in India, would have¹⁹ to be taken into account. He also challenged the legality of the McMahon Line which India had always claimed as the north-east border in accordance with the Simla Convention of 1914. Indian authorities finally woke up to the unpleasant fact that it was not the Tibetans, but the Chinese that had been running Tibet's external affairs for the last eight years.

Besides the Aksai Chin incident, in which an Indian Army patrol was captured and detained by the Chinese, there was also one major incursion in the Walong sector of NEFA. Despite these incidents, Nehru apparently still hoped for a rapid turnaround in the deteriorating relations with China.

On October 8, 1958, India sent a strong protest to Peking reaffirming India's sovereignty in the Aksai Chin. In a reply dated November 3, 1958, the Chinese for the first time positively and publicly asserted their claim on the Aksai Chin.²⁰ Now the Tibetan border with India had finally come alive, and Sino-Indian relationship, which had headed for an ultimate collision course since the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, plunged to an all-time low.

By 1958 China had also performed an about-face in her foreign policy, and lost all interest in so-called "peaceful co-existence". She talked and breathed fire, apparently willing to take the whole world in her stride. Both internally and externally China adopted dogmatic policies and prided herself as being a militant communist country. Internal conditions, the stage of economic development, the requirement of national interests as Peking saw them-- all these produced a reappraisal of foreign policy. Thus a new hard, uncompromising line emerged. China got into an increasingly bitter controversy with the Soviets because the Chinese were afraid that the Russians would make a deal with the United States which would not be in their interests. It was India that had to pay an especially heavy penalty by the change in China's foreign policy, and the border had become the core of the problem.

An additional factor which fueled the deterioration in relations was the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans into India as a result of the Tibetan uprising in the summer of 1959. This evoked deep emotions in India where historical and cultural ties with Tibet had been very intimate. The Indian people were deeply aroused over the now widely reported ruthless suppression in Tibet, and the Chinese were enraged over the political asylum and sympathy given to the Dalai

Lama and the Tibetan refugees by India. All this served to intensify the Sino-Indian border dispute and their relations suffered a further decline. With the Dalai Lama safe in India, the hopes of the Tibetan people for eventual freedom were kept alive, and a major propaganda defeat had been inflicted on the Chinese. From this point on there was a steady deterioration in relations between Peking and New Delhi.

The border crisis worsened, and all trade across Indo-Tibetan border was soon affected. From August to October 1959, there were three serious border incidents between Indian and Chinese troops. The Indian Prime Minister informed the Lok Shaba (the Lower House of Parliament) about these incidents on August 28, 1959, and also mentioned that control of the Indo-Tibetan border had been placed under Indian military authorities. In September 1959, China laid formal claim to some 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and NEFA. By the end of 1959, growing public demand in India for an extreme and absolute approach to the border problem was seriously hindering Nehru's desperate attempts to seek a negotiated settlement.

Sino-Indian relations were caught in a web that contained the most sensitive issues of both nations. Public sentiment in India about the border had turned it into a question of principle; India's national pride was at stake. Similarly, the Aksai Chin road, which had been built to maintain internal security in Tibet, had taken on significantly greater importance in China's national defenses both in Tibet and in Sinkiang province. The Chinese saw the strategic value of this highway becoming increasingly greater as the relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. In short, China seemed committed to retain possession of the Aksai Chin

at all costs.

With such divergent views in Indian and Chinese policies, the return to normalcy in Sino-Indian relations was doomed. Thus, the quest for peaceful co-existence, which India and China had propagated to the world in 1954 was dead within five short years. The Indo-Tibetan border which had not been of any great significance in 1950 had assumed new importance for both India and China, and Sino-Indian relations which had thrived as long as the border was not addressed, died quickly when the border problem came into focus.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 affected the regional stability of Central and South Asia, and it has and will continue to play an important part in influencing events in this area. First, the People's Republic of China and India became involved in a border dispute that apparently does not seem to have any workable solution unless both nations are willing to grant concessions that even today are considered unthinkable. Second, Tibet has assumed great strategic importance for the national security of China vis-a-vis India and the Soviet Union. Third, the face of Tibet has been completely changed and it has been turned into a military base. The possibility of turmoil within Tibet remains and cannot be ruled out even after three decades of Chinese rule.

The 1962 war between India and China revealed the seriousness of the border dispute that had its origin with the Chinese arrival in Tibet. A border which had never been disputed for a thousand years suddenly suddenly became the core of the dispute when the Chinese troops arrived there. Although the disputed areas were barren and sparsely populated, there was much more involved than a few thousand square miles of cold desert-like areas. To this date there has been no progress in settling this dispute.

For India, it was and still is an issue of national pride and sovereignty. The defeat she suffered at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 touched the most sensitive area of the national pride of India, and Indians are still smarting from this humiliation. The compromise proposed by Chou

En-lai, trading recognition of the Aksai Chin as Chinese in return for Chinese recognition of the MacMahon Line as the border in the NEFA, still stands, although. China has expressed its willingness to make up for the loss of territory due to this barter by exchanging territories of the NEFA for those of Aksai Chin. India has consistently refused this proposal, and insists that all of the Aksai Chin must be returned to her.

The Chinese proposal has been viewed by Indian authorities as politically impossible, primarily due to the domestic political instability in India. With a strong government in India, the Chinese initiative could possibly bear fruit, but India's increasingly strong ties with the Soviet Union has made the Chinese cautious and the Indians hesitant. Furthermore, any compromise by India which results in the loss of even a small part of the Aksai Chin is bound to rekindle old animosities on the part of the Indian public. Few political parties would want to risk their political future on an old, yet smouldering issue.

For the Chinese, national defense and the Aksai Chin are very closely linked and there can be no compromise in this area. China wants and needs undisputed control over the Aksai Chin highway. Over the last three decades this road has grown significantly more important for the purpose of preserving Chinese interests in Tibet and Sinkiang Province. The Aksai Chin road diversifies the supply routes to the Sino-Soviet border in the Sinkiang province and is therefore of vital importance. Chinese claims to the Aksai Chin are thus inextricably linked to the Sino-Soviet dispute.


The strategic importance of Tibet has also grown tremendously over the years and the Chinese are of course fully aware of this. The border

conflict with India requires stationing and maintaining a huge force in Tibet. As long as this dispute is not resolved, the Chinese army in Tibet will remain in strength to defend areas of importance. The Chinese have a great relative edge over the Indians in geographic position. Whereas the Chinese army has to climb less than a few thousand feet to reach the Himalayan passes leading into India, the Indians have to ascend three or four times as much to reach the same passes. This would make a great difference in any fighting at these high altitudes.

On the conventional side it is estimated that China has anywhere from 250,000 to 750,000 troops in Tibet, with nearly 200,000 of these troops along the disputed border with India. With the road network she has in Tibet, China can quickly reinforce as needed. Besides the road network, China has over 20 airfields, over a dozen of them military air bases, in Tibet, and these air bases are constantly being upgraded and improved. (See Map LX for the road network within Tibet.)

This huge force in Tibet can be used as quick reinforcements to Sinkiang in case of an escalation of the Sino-Soviet border dispute. Troops going to Sinkiang from Tibet would be less vulnerable to Soviet air interdiction than those going through Tsinghai Province, which borders Mongolia, a Soviet ally. Given the choice, China would like to place more troops in Tibet if she could maintain them on this barren plateau. These troops would act both as a fighting force along the extended Indo-Tibetan border and at the same time serve as a reserve force for Sinkiang.

Another factor, also related to the escalation of Sino-Soviet rivalry, has increased the strategic importance of Tibet. In the late sixties China moved her nuclear facilities from Sinkiang Province to northern Tibet.



MAP X

Source:- Pelissier, op. cit., Illustrations.

They took this action to place Chinese nuclear facilities as far away as possible from Soviet aircraft in Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border regions. Reports indicate that the Chinese have placed their nuclear facilities in a valley surrounded by high mountains which makes it more difficult for the Soviets to attack them with bombs or missiles. Since that move in the late sixties, northern Tibet has replaced Lop Nor in Sinkiang as the center for China's nuclear testing facilities.

In the late seventies China deployed about a hundred of her medium range nuclear missiles around the town of Rudok in western Tibet. This location has insured that the same missiles would be capable of striking targets in both in India and the Soviet Union. This action has of course greatly perturbed the Indian government.

Since the Tibetan invasion, the Chinese have displaced over 100,000 Tibetans from Tibet, and the population of Tibet has been supplemented by an equal number of Han Chinese immigrants who were encouraged to move to Tibet. The Tibetans who live as refugees outside Tibet have, whenever possible, engaged in subversive activities against the Chinese. With their leader, the Dalai Lama, who someday expects to return to a free Tibet, and a significant number of Tibetans of the old order still living outside Tibet, there is a great driving force seeking a free Tibet. Similarly, a great number of old Tibetans still living within Tibet remain ready to seize any opportunity to rebel against the Chinese. In this regard, the true loyalty of the younger generation of Tibetans remains debatable.

FUTURE TRENDS AND CONCLUSION

Within the last three decades, Tibet has emerged as an invaluable

part of China. China has filled the power vacuum in Tibet and decisively broken Tibet's isolation. The immense efforts that the Chinese exerted in building roads, constructing air fields, industrialization, economic development and Han colonisation of Tibet suggests that the Chinese plan to fully utilise the strategic advantages of Tibet to influence and project their power into South and Central Asia. The Chinese have successfully demonstrated that Tibet can be used as the springboard for attack south of the Himalayas if necessary. China enjoys a great advantage by virtue of her position north of the Himalayas, and she would be less than willing to quit that advantageous position.

China will continue to develop her industrial and logistical base in Tibet and further increase her strategic advantages in relation to the nations lying south of the Himalayas. This base will also serve as an equally important springboard for sending troops to the Sino-Soviet border in the Sinkiang Province-- a valuable asset.

The Aksai Chin road is the lifeline of both Tibet and Sinkiang Province during conflicts with either India or the Russians. Therefore Chinese claims to the Aksai Chin will remain as rigid as ever. The possibility of a settlement in the Sino-Indian border dispute will remain low as long as the Indian government refuses to barter the Aksai Chin for areas in the NEFA. The ancient northern route to Sinkiang Province through Tsinghai Province, following the main Silk Route, proved insufficient for the rapid movement of troops and supplies during the border clashes with the Soviets, and the Aksai Chin road is the only road that removes this serious deficit. China needs Tibet and will keep it at all costs.

The cherished dream that every Tibetan refugee has of seeing an

independent Tibet governed by the Dalai Lama grows more remote by the day. Some day, if the Dalai Lama and the multitude of Tibetan refugees living in India do return to Tibet, they might easily find themselves as a minority group within Tibet. With the establishment of a dynamic power fueled by the People's Republic of China, the political and the military situation in Tibet has changed almost to the extent of no return.

FOOTNOTES

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"Upheaval in the Hills", Newsweek, November 20, 1950, p. 32.
5. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
6. See Figure I for Tibet and her neighbours.
7. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 148-150.
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9. Bista, Dor Bahadur, Report from Lhasa, Kathmandu, Nepal, Sajha Prakashan, 1979.

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Chapter II

The Background

Geographical Background

1. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 129.
2. Karan, op. cit., p. 22.
3. Ibid, p. 8.
4. Bista, op. cit., p. 36.
5. Map I : C.I.A. map of 1979.

Map II : Richardson, H.E., A Short History of Tibet, New York, E.P.Dutton and Co., Inc, 1962, page following p. 298.

Historical Background

6. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 69-72.
7. Karan, op. cit., p. 10.
8. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 72.
9. Li, op. cit., p. 29. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 2.
10. Li, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
11. Li, op. cit., p.31.

12. Karan, op. cit., p. 10.
Rockhill, W. Woodville, "Tibet, a Geographical, Ethnographical and Historical Sketch Derived From Chinese Sources", reprint from The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, no date, p. 72.
13. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 72.
14. Li, op. cit., p. 37.
15. Karan, op. cit., p. 10.
16. Li, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
17. Rockhill, op. cit., p. 72. Li, op. cit., p. 38.
18. Rockhill, op. cit., p. 73. Chinese records show that this child was two years old.
19. Li, op. cit., p. 39. Rockhill, op. cit., p. 73. There is a conflict in these two versions as to who appealed to the Chinese Emperor for help.
20. Rockhill, op. cit., p. 73. Li, op. cit., p. 39. Both versions agree in this aspect.
21. Li, op. cit., p. 40.
22. Ibid, pp. 43-44.
23. Karan, op. cit., p. 11.
24. Li, op. cit., p. 66.
25. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 76.

26. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 76. Li, op. cit., p. 69. The exact date of departure is in conflict according to these two sources.
27. Li, op. cit., pp. 130-133.
28. Ibid, op. cit., pp. 134-135. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 77.
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31. Li, op. cit., p. 165.
32. Ibid, p. 168. Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, op. cit., p. 145.
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Chinese Overlordship in Tibet

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38. Li, op. cit., p. 192.

Chapter III

The Invasion and World Reaction

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6. Peissel, op. cit., p. 13.
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8.
Karen, op. cit., p. 15.
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11.
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12.
Peissel, op. cit., pp. 17-18. Harrer, op. cit., p. 280.
13.
Ekvall, Robert B., Tibetan Sky Lines, New York, Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953, pp. 239-240.
14.
The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 81.
15.
Peissel, op. cit., p. 14.
16.
Harrer, op. cit., p. 280.
17.
The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 81, and Harrer, op. cit., p. 281. These two sources disagree to whether a delegation was sent to Peking or not, but according to the report by Peissel no delegation was sent to Peking.
18.
The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 80-81, and Harrer, op. cit., p. 280. These two sources disagree whether any preparation was undertaken to offer organized resistance against the Chinese.
19.
"Character of Tibet Traced," Christian Science Monitor, Boston, March 29, 1950, p. 2-3.

20. Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 273.
21. Shen and Liu, op. cit., p. 63.
22. Peissel, op. cit., pp. 19-25.
23. Harrer, op. cit., pp. 259-265.
24. Peissel, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
Patterson, George N., Traagic Destiny, London, Faber and Faber, 1959, pp. 21-24.
25. Peissel, op. cit., p. 29. The Dalai Lama's brother left in the summer. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 83-84. This report shows that the Dalai Lama's brother arrived in Lhasa after the Dalai Lama was enthroned.
26. Peissel, op. cit., p. 30. On December 5, 1950, the Times of London had a news report from Hong Kong in which the Chinese had accused Robert Ford of poisoning a high lama who was the Deputy Chairman of Sikang provincial government council, and who was on a voluntary mission to Lhasa to win over the Dalai Lama.
27. Harrer, op. cit., p. 264.
28. Peissel, op. cit., p. 43. Although there are conflicting reports as to whether troops were sent to the eastern provinces to fight the Chinese, the report that Muha met a detachment of soldiers coming from Lhasa shows that troops were sent to the east, a fact which the Dalai Lama has not mentioned in his account.

29.

The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 82. This shows that Ngabo wanted to take full responsibility of Kham, and asked for permission to do so even though his initial instructions were to share the work with Lhalu.

Pelesel, op. cit., pp. 34-35. This shows that Ngabo was a favourite of the Dalai Lama, and he had many weaknesses. His statement twelve years later show that his sympathies were with the Chinese from the beginning. Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, op. cit., p. 164 This account also shows that Ngabo was a collaborator.

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"Preparation for the 'Liberation' of Tibet Reported," New York Times, New York, August 1, 1950, p. 8.

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"Sinkiang Reported to be Chinese Base for Entry," New York Times, New York, August 23, 1950, p. 12.

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35.

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"Communist Chinese Reported Willing to Settle the Tibetan Question Peacefully," Christian Science Monitor, Boston, August 30, 1950, p. 7.

37. "Tibetans in India will Meet Nehru," New York Times, New York, September 6, 1950, p. 20.

38. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 82.

39. Peissel, op. cit., p. 37.

40. Ibid, p. 31.

41. Karan, op. cit., p. 15.

42. Peissel, op. cit., p. 39. Here it says that the Chinese crossed the Yangtse at three points.

43. Ibid, p. 40.

44. "Chinese Red Forces in Northern Tibet," New York Times, New York, October 7, 1950, p. 1.

"Chinese Communists Deny Tibet Invasion," New York Times, New York, October 8, 1950, p. 2.

45. Peissel, op. cit., p. 40, and Harrer, op. cit., p. 297. It took ten days for the news of the Chinese invasion to reach Lhasa, and even then it had to be confirmed before acting on it.

46. Peissel, op. loc.

47. "Tibet Reported Invaded," New York Times, New York, October 12, 1950, p. 6.

48. Peissel, op. cit., pp. 35-41, and Harrer, op. cit., p. 298. The Dalai Lama's account does not mention Ngabo's message to Lhasa.
49. Ibid., pp. 42-43, and Ibid., pp. 297-298. The dates of these events from 11-16 October have been calculated from the accounts of these authors.
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"Fireworks Blitz," Newsweek, January 29, 1951, p. 42. This article states that on the 19th of October Ngabo was still in Chamdo, but tracing the accounts of various author, this seems not to be true.
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54. "Chinese Troops Reported Moving in to Invade Tibet," Christian Science Monitor, Boston, October 25, 1950, p. 9.
55. "Peking Says Tibetans Set to Surrender," Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 1950, p. 13.
56. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 82.
57. "This Time, Tibet," Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1950, p. E-1.
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78. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 87.
79. Li, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
80. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 88.

Chapter IV

Chinese Occupation and The Uprising

1. Dalvi, op. cit., pp. 43-47.
2. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 89.
3. Ibid., p. 90.
4. Moraes, op. cit., p. 68.

5. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 90.
6. The name of General Chang Kuo-hua has been spelled as Tang Ko-hwa in some other books.
7. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 91, and Harrer, op. cit., p. 313. Elstob, op. cit., p. 206. This report states that during the winter of 1951 many weak and elderly died of hunger.
8. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 92, and Peissel, op. cit., p. 52.
9. Peissel, op. cit., pp. 44-46.
10. Karan, op. cit., p. 22.
11. Li, op. cit., p. 208.
12. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 95-98.
13. Moraes, op. cit., p. 71.
14. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 116.
15. Karan, op. cit., p. 24, and Moraes, op. cit., pp. 71-72. The importance that the Chinese gave to Ngabo by appointing him to various crucial and important positions like the governor of Chando and then the secretary general of the Preparatory Committee, shows that he was a man trusted by the Chinese.
16. Peissel, op. cit., p. 57.
17. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 127-129.

18. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
Peissel, op. cit., pp. 64-66.
19. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 141-143. The Dalai Lama alleges that this invitation from the India was concealed by the Chinese authorities until circumstances forced them to reveal it.
20. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 148, and Peissel, op. cit., p. 93. Chou En-Lai came to Delhi the day after the Dalai Lama met with Nehru, and Peissel suggests that the Chinese were tipped off by Nehru about the Dalai Lama's wish not to return to Tibet and so Chou En-Lai rushed to India to convince him to return because the situation in Tibet was very bad.
21. Peissel, op. cit., pp. 65-95.
22. Ibid., p. 102.
23. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 163.
24. Barber, Noel, From the Land of Lost Content, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970, p. 23.
25. Ibid., pp. 61-63.
26. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
27. Richardson, op. cit., p. 207. The Dalai Lama had received an invitation to visit China in the Autumn of 1958, but he had declined because of the religious tests that were coming up during the summer of 1959.
28. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 166-169, and Barber, op. cit., pp. 74-77.

29. Ibid., p. 169, and Ibid., p. 78. The Dalai Lama's account states that the Cabinet did not urge him to leave Tibet, but Barber says that his three most trusted advisors did urge him to go.
30. Ibid., p. 172, and Ibid., pp. 83-84. Noel maintains that this man had come to assassinate the Dalai Lama, after the news of the Dalai Lama's cancelled visit became known on the Chinese camp.
31. The Dalai Lama's account says that three ministers went to the Chinese camp to meet General Tan, but Barber says only two ministers went.
32. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 186. This letter was the first of three letters exchanged between the Dalai Lama and General Tan from March 10 to 16. The meaning of these letters have been interpreted in different ways.
33. Barber, op. cit., pp. 100-102.
34. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., p. 194, Barber, op. cit., p. 107 and Richardson, op. cit., p. 209. These three reports disagree as where the shells landed. The Dalai Lama maintains that the shells landed outside the Norbulinka, but both Barber and Richardson state that the shells fell inside the grounds of the Norbulinka.
35. Barber, op. cit., p. 119. The magnitude of the storm surprised all.
36. Ibid., pp. 198-199.
37. Ibid., p. 129, and Moraes, op. cit., p. 14. See Map VII for the Dalai Lama's escape route to India.
38. Barber, op. cit., p. 129.

39. Morass, op. cit., p. 12. The author maintains that open rebellion broke out on the 19th of March when the Dalai Lama's bodyguards and two other Tibetan Regiments launched armed attacks against PLA positions.
40. Barber, op. cit., p. 143.
41. Barber, op. cit., p. 180, and Morass, op. cit., p. 13.
42. Barber, op. cit., pp. 182-184.

Chapter V

The Invasion and Sino-Indian Relations

1. Whitney, R.W., Major, "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute," Part I, in the Australian Army Journal, No. 161, October 1962, p. 24.
2. There is controversy as to whether it was India or Burma which recognized China first.
3. Dutt, Vidya Prakash, "China: Jealous Neighbor," in Current History, Vol. 44, No. 259, March 1963, p. 136.
4. Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
5. "Red Face Department: Nehru Bitter at Red China Crossup," in Newsweek, November 6, 1950, p. 31.
6. The Dalai Lama, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
7. The Seventeen-Point Agreement in Appendix "C".

8. Dutt, op. cit., p. 138.
9. Ibid, op. loc.
10. Thomas, Lowell Jr., The Silent War in Tibet, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959, p. 213.
11. Moraes, op. cit., p. 126.
12. Dalvi, op. cit., p. 85.
13. Dutt, op. cit., 135.
14. The Bandung Conference met in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 1955, and was attended by 29 independent Asian and African nations.
15. Dalvi, op. cit., p. 46.
16. Rose, Leo E., "Conflict in The Himalayas," in the Military Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, February 1963.
17. Fisher, Rose and Huttenback, op. cit., p. 86.
18. Dalvi, op. cit., pp. 41-48.
19. Dutt, op. cit., p. 139.
20. Levi, Warner, "The Sino-Indian Border War," in Current History, Vol. 45, No. 265, September 1963, pp. 137-139.

APPENDIX A

CONVENTION between Great Britain, China and Tibet - 1914

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the Continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia H O;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Corje; who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:-

Article 1

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

Article 2

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

Article 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, not to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of

September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

Article 4

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

Article 5

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

Article 6

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX (d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term "Foreign Power" does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

Article 7

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.

(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Anti-

cles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

Article 8

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

Article 9

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

Article 10

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

Article 11

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger year.

Initial of the Lonchen Shatra

(Initialed) A.H.M.

Seal of the

Seal of the

Lonchen Shatra

British Plenipotentiary

Schedule

1. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March, 1890.
2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.
3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:-

1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.
3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the escort to the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim border.

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatories to this Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial of Lonchen Shatra.

(Initialled) A.H.M.

Seal of the Lonchen Shatra.

Seal of the British
Plenipotentiary.

APPENDIX B

Notes exchanged between China and India in October 1950

India's Note of October 26

We have seen with great regret the report in the newspapers of an official statement made in Peiping to the effect that "People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet."

We have received no intimation of this from your Ambassador here or from our Ambassador in Peiping.

We have been repeatedly assured of a desire by the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In an interview which India's Ambassador had recently with (China's) Vice Foreign Minister, the latter, while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to "liberate" Tibet had expressed a continued desire to do so by peaceful means.

We have informed the Chinese Government through our Ambassador of the decision of the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peiping immediately to start negotiations. This delegation actually left Delhi yesterday. In view of these facts the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us as most suprising and regrettable.

We realise there has been a delay in the Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peiping. This delay was caused in the first instance by an inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong for which the delegation is in no way responsible.

Subsequently the delegation came back to Delhi because of the wish of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first

be conducted in Delhi with the Chinese Ambassador.

Owing to the lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their Government who in turn had to consult their Assemblies, certain further delay took place.

The Government of India does not believe that any foreign influences hostile to China have been responsible for the delay in the delegation's departure.

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronized with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.

The Government of India can only express their deep regret that in spite of friendly disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them the Chinese Government should have decided to seek the solution of the problems of their relations with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.

China's reply of October 29

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's

Government.

The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations and it welcomes, therefore, the delegation of local authorities of Tibet to come to Peiping at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

Yet the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure for Peiping. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations.

But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations and whatever the results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated. The particular problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems.

Therefore with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence expresses its deep regret.

India's note of October 31

(1)

India's Ambassador at Peiping has transmitted to the Government of India a note handed to him by the Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China on October 30. The Government of India have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese

Government's reply that the Government of India's representation to them was affected by foreign influence hostile to China and categorically repudiate it.

At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as in other matters, the Government of India's policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards the peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions of the world.

(2)

The Government of China is equally mistaken in thinking the Tibetan delegation's departure for Peiping was delayed by outside instigation. In previous communications, the Government of India have explained at some length the reason why the Tibetan delegation could not proceed to Peiping earlier. They are convinced there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

(3)

It is with no desire to interfere or gain any advantage that the Government of India have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be affected by peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. Tibetan autonomy is a fact which, judging from reports they have received from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognize and foster.

The Government of India's repeated suggestions that Chinese suzerainty in Tibet autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiation was not, as the Chinese Government seems to suggest, but well-meant

advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.

(4)

Wedded as they are to the ways of peace, the Government of India had been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government were also desirous to effect a settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this, the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to send their delegation to Peiping, and were glad that this advice was accepted in the interchange of communications which have been taking place between the Government of India and the Government of China, and the former had received repeated assurances that peaceful settlement was aimed at.

In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when it learned that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against peaceful people. There had been no allegation that there had been any provocation, or any report as to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there was no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step, involving an attempt to impose a decision by force, could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Government of India are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peiping unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

(5)

Every step that the Government of India has taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In so doing they

often have been misunderstood and criticized, but they adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking that military operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the drift towards general war, which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid.

(6)

The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions as to Tibet and do not seek any novel privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time, they pointed out, certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural between neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations.

These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Government of India in Lhasa, the existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung, and the maintenance of post and telegraph offices at the trade route up to Gyantse over forty years. The Government of India are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. The personnel at the Lhasa mission and the agencies at Gyantse and Yatung accordingly have been instructed to stay at their posts.

(7)

It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual interests

Recent developments in Tibet have affected these friendly rela-

tions and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regrets.

In conclusion, the Government of India can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese Government will still prefer the method of peaceful negotiation and settlement to a solution under duress and by force.

APPENDIX C

AGREEMENT ON MEASURES FOR THE
PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET
(17-Point Agreement of May 23, 1951)

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great Motherland. But, over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the Kuomintang reactionary Government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deception and provocation and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland. Under such conditions the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and sufferings. In 1949 basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities- the Kuomintang reactionary Government- was overthrown and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities- the aggressive imperialist forces- was driven out. On this basis the founding of the Chinese People's Government (CPG) was announced.

In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the CPG declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the CPR are equal and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and opposed imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the CPR will become a big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within the big family of all nationalities of the CPR, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, and the CPG shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country- with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the CPG and the direct leadership of higher levels of people's governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the CPR accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the CPR to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work, the CPR, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. In the latter part of April 1951 the

delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The CPG appointed representatives with full powers of the local government of Tibet. As a result of the talks both parties agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

(1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland- the People's Republic of China.

(2) The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.

(3) In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the CPG.

(4) The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and power of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

(5) The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

(6) By established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the thirteenth Dalai Lama and of the ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

(7) The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the CPPCC shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect

a change in the income of the monasteries.

(8) Tibetan troops shall be reorganised step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defence forces of the CPR.

(9) The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

(10) Tibetan agriculture, livestock-raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

(11) In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and, when the people raise demands for reforms, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel in Tibet.

(12) In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

(13) The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a needle or thread from the people.

(14) The CPG shall have centralised handling of all external affairs of the areas of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

(15) In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG shall set up a Military and Administrative Committee and a Military Area HQ in Tibet and- apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG- shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Military and Administrative Committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts and various principal monasteries; the name-list shall be set forth after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and various quarters concerned and shall be submitted to the CPG for appointment.

(16) Funds needed by the Military and Administrative Committee, the Military Area HQ and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG. The local government of Tibet should assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

(17) This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the CPG with full powers: Chief Delegate- Li Wei-Han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); Delegates- Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan. Delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet: Chief Delegate- Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape); Delegates- Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khenchung Thupten Tenthar, Khenchung Thupten Lekmuun, Rimshi Samposay Tenzin Thundup. Peking, 23rd May, 1951.

APPENDIX D

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE
BETWEEN TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA

(Sino-Indian Agreement, April 29, 1954)

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India.

Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

- (1) mutual respect of each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- (2) mutual non-aggression,
- (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
- (4) equality and mutual benefit, and
- (5) peaceful co-existence.

And for this purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the Republic of India, H.E. Nedyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People's Republic of China; the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, H.E. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government, who, having examined each other's cre-

dentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:-

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies:

(1) The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.

(2) The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

(1) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, ordinary to customary practice.

(2) The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyantse-Khargo, (4) Gyantse-Chakra, (5) Ramura,

(6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Thasigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet Region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:-

(1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavan Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.

(2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Benaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

(3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:

(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lakh pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangtsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE V

For travelling across the border, the High Contracting Parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visased by the other Party except as provided in Paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

(1) Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border check-posts of the other Party.

(2) Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other Party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and routes specified in Article IV above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

(3) Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border check-posts of the other Party.

(4) Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoints of the other Party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

(6) Persons who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

ARTICLE VI

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the twenty-ninth day of April, 1954, in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

(Sd.) Nedyam Raghavan
Plenipotentiary of the
Government of the
Republic of India

(Sd.) Chang Han-fu
Plenipotentiary of the
Central People's
Government, People's
Republic of China

NOTE

Peking, April 29, 1954

Your Excellency Mr. Vice-Foreign Minister,

In the course of our discussions regarding the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India, which has been happily concluded today, the Delegation of the Government of the Republic of India and the Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of Notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:-

(1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months from date of exchange of the present notes the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

(2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Government of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between

the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall continue as rest houses.

(4) The Government of China agrees that all buildings within the compound walls of the Trade Agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its Agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And the Government of India agrees that the Trade Agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from the Indian side for the use of the Agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian Trade Agency at Gartok. The Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese Trade Agency at New Delhi.

(5) The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

If there are godowns and buildings of the Government of India on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is a need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agrees to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores and pertaining thereto.

(6) The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the

laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

(7) The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

(8) The hospitals of the India Trade Agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian Trade Agencies.

(9) Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

(10) The Government of China agrees, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulanchung (Taklakot) to Kang Riapoche (Kailas) and Mavan Teo (Manasarover); and the Government of India agrees to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

(11) Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

(12) The three Trade Agencies of each Party may function throughout the year.

(13) Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in places under the jurisdiction of the other Party.

(14) Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in accordance with local regulations at places as provided in Article II of the Agreement.

(15) Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of India I hereby agree that the present Note along with Your Excellency's reply shall

become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present Notes.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency
Vice-Foreign Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Central People's Government,
People's Republic of China

(Sd.) N. Raghavan
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary of
the Republic of India

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